

**MONITORING  
THE IMPACT OF THE  
PEACE, RECOVERY AND  
DEVELOPMENT PLAN ON  
PEACE AND CONFLICT  
IN ACHOLI AND  
LANGO**

## About International Alert

International Alert helps people find peaceful solutions to conflict.

We are one of the world's leading peacebuilding organisations, with nearly 30 years of experience laying the foundations for peace.

We work with local people around the world to help them build peace. And we advise governments, organisations and companies on how to support peace.

We focus on issues which influence peace, including governance, economics, gender relations, social development, climate change, and the role of businesses and international organisations in high-risk places.

**[www.international-alert.org](http://www.international-alert.org)**

© International Alert 2013. Published July 2013

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution.

Layout by D. R. ink

Front cover illustration: D. R. ink

**MONITORING THE IMPACT OF THE PEACE,  
RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN ON  
PEACE AND CONFLICT IN ACHOLI AND LANGO**

**2011-2012**

## Acknowledgements

This report falls within the overall aim of strengthening the potential of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) and the recovery process to address the causes of the civil conflict and contribute to sustainable peace and stability in northern Uganda. It is a monitoring report to assess the extent to which interventions under the PRDP, particularly those funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), succeeded or failed in achieving peacebuilding aims in Acholi and Lango in 2011 and 2012.

We would like to thank Rosie Pinnington who worked hard to compile this report. The data for this report was drawn from the survey commissioned by International Alert. The study was conducted and analysed by Associates Research. The report was edited by Robert Senath Esuruku and Bernard Atuhaire, International Alert Uganda. Richard Businge and Louis Okello, all of International Alert Uganda, provided technical support and have contributed to the drafting of this report, as did several Alert colleagues based in London.

Thanks to all the research assistants and the respondents who have participated in the study. We would particularly like to thank the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) for its contribution in the revision of our monitoring framework. We would like to extend our gratitude to the district local governments who have been supportive during data collection and validation exercises. We would also like to thank our partners the Refugee Law Project and Saferworld for supporting the processes of this study.

We are grateful to our donor, the UK Department for International Development UKAID, for the financial support given to conduct this study.

International Alert is also grateful for the support from our strategic donors: the UK Department for International Development UKAID; the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency; the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

The opinions expressed in this report are solely those of International Alert and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of our donors.

# Contents

Tables and figures	4
Abbreviations and acronyms	5
Executive summary	6
<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>12</b>
1.1 Background	12
1.2 Research conceptualisation and objectives	13
<b>2. Confidence in sustained peace and security</b>	<b>15</b>
2.1 Confidence in sustained peace and security	15
2.2 Involvement in conflict	17
2.3 Types of conflict	18
2.4 Cause of conflicts	20
2.5 Conflict actors	21
2.6 Peacebuilding initiatives	26
2.7 “Hardware” v “software” approaches to peacebuilding	27
<b>3. Local government responsiveness to community needs</b>	<b>30</b>
3.1 Local government responsiveness to community needs	31
3.2 Community participation in local government planning activities	36
3.3 Governance and accountability challenges	38
<b>4. Conflict-resolution mechanisms for addressing community-level security</b>	<b>40</b>
4.1 Community use of conflict-resolution mechanisms	40
4.2 Traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms	41
4.3 Traditional methods and SGBV	42
4.4 Multiple channels and land conflict	43
4.5 Reasons for conflict-resolution failure	44
4.6 Capacity and knowledge gaps among users and providers	45
<b>5. Access to economic opportunities</b>	<b>48</b>
5.1 Access to sufficient economic opportunities	49
5.2 Respondent incomes and income sufficiency	50
5.3 Failure of agricultural sector development	52
5.4 Government responses to economic needs	53
5.5 Financial institutions and their use	55
<b>6. Competition and grievances between regions</b>	<b>58</b>
6.1 Perceptions of living conditions in other regions	59
6.2 Government efforts to address regional imbalances	63
<b>7. Conclusions and recommendations</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>Annex: Methodology</b>	<b>71</b>

## Tables and figures

<b>Table 1:</b>	Confidence in sustained peace and security by gender and age	16
<b>Table 2:</b>	Involved in conflict in last two years	17
<b>Table 3:</b>	Types of conflict	18
<b>Table 4:</b>	Cause of conflicts	21
<b>Table 5:</b>	Actors in conflicts	21
<b>Table 6:</b>	Peacebuilding initiatives in the community	27
<b>Table 7:</b>	Local government responsiveness to community needs by gender and age	32
<b>Table 8:</b>	Satisfaction with local government responsiveness	33
<b>Table 9:</b>	Dissatisfaction with local government responsiveness	34
<b>Table 10:</b>	Participation in local government planning by district	37
<b>Table 11:</b>	Conflicts reporting and status of their case	40
<b>Table 12:</b>	Mechanisms being used to resolve cases	41
<b>Table 13:</b>	Reasons for failing to resolve conflicts	44
<b>Table 14:</b>	Access to sufficient economic opportunities by gender and age	49
<b>Table 15:</b>	Failure to take advantage of available economic opportunities	50
<b>Table 16:</b>	Respondent sources of income	51
<b>Table 17:</b>	Respondents' income sufficiency	51
<b>Table 18:</b>	Government responsiveness to economic needs	53
<b>Table 19:</b>	Access to credit	55
<b>Table 20:</b>	Investment plans and source of finance for plans	56
<b>Table 21:</b>	Perception of living conditions in other regions by district (2011)	59
<b>Table 22:</b>	Level of development in own region compared with others (2012)	61
<b>Table 23:</b>	Perception of why other regions are better off (2012)	62
<b>Table 24:</b>	Perception of why own region is worse off compared with others (2012)	62
<b>Table 25:</b>	Perception of whether government is addressing regional imbalances	63
<b>Table 26:</b>	Perception of whether other regions receive more resources from government	63
<b>Table 27:</b>	Suggestions to address regional imbalances	64
<b>Table 28:</b>	Sample demographic characteristics	72
<b>Figure 1:</b>	Involved in conflict in the last two years by sub-region	18
<b>Figure 2:</b>	Types of conflicts by sub-region	19
<b>Figure 3:</b>	Types of conflict by sub-region and by gender	20
<b>Figure 4:</b>	Local government responsiveness to community needs by district	33
<b>Figure 5:</b>	Dissatisfaction with education services by district	35
<b>Figure 6:</b>	Dissatisfaction with health services by district	35
<b>Figure 7:</b>	Participation in local government planning by sub-region and gender	37
<b>Figure 8:</b>	Respondents' income sufficiency by sub-region	51
<b>Figure 9:</b>	Respondents' income sufficiency by gender	52
<b>Figure 10:</b>	Government responsiveness to economic needs by sub-region	53
<b>Figure 11:</b>	Perception of government responsiveness to other regions by sub-region	64

## Abbreviations and acronyms

<b>ACCS</b>	Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity
<b>CSO</b>	Civil society organisation
<b>DFID</b>	UK Department for International Development
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced person
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>KI</b>	Key informant
<b>KII</b>	Key informant interview
<b>LC</b>	Local council/councillor
<b>LRA</b>	Lord's Resistance Army
<b>MTR</b>	Mid-term review
<b>NAADS</b>	National Agricultural Advisory Services
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organisation
<b>NORAD</b>	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
<b>NUSAF</b>	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>OPM</b>	Office of the Prime Minister
<b>PCDP</b>	Post-Conflict Development Programme
<b>PCI</b>	Peace and conflict indicator
<b>PRDP</b>	Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda
<b>SACCO</b>	Savings and credit cooperative
<b>SGBV</b>	Sexual and gender-based violence
<b>UBOS</b>	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>VSLA</b>	Village savings and loans association
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

## Executive summary

In 2007, the government of Uganda unveiled the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) – a comprehensive framework designed to guide efforts to consolidate peace and security and lay the foundation for recovery and development in the region. The PRDP has four strategic objectives: consolidation of state authority; rebuilding and empowering communities; revitalisation of the economy; and peace and reconciliation. The plan was designed to direct the recovery interventions of the government and the development partners under a guiding national framework.

In December 2009, the British Government approved a £100 million five-year grant, under the UK Department for International Development (DFID), for a Post-Conflict Development Programme (PCDP) in northern Uganda. The PCDP's goal is to create economic, social and political opportunities that improve the lives of people affected by conflict. The PCDP seeks to improve access to key basic services, especially health and education; reverse economic stagnation; tackle youth unemployment; tackle extreme poverty and vulnerability; and support national reconciliation and conflict-resolution processes. The PCDP is aligned to the PRDP and seeks to contribute to the comprehensive post-conflict recovery and development process in the region.

Under the PCDP, the DFID also established a partnership with International Alert, the Refugee Law Project and Saferworld to support the formation of an Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS). The overall aim of the ACCS is to assist the DFID and its partners in strengthening the potential of the PRDP and the recovery process to address the causes of conflict and contribute to sustainable peace and stability. Alert is leading the ACCS in its Output 1: 'Monitoring of the extent to which interventions under the PRDP, particularly those funded by the DFID, succeed or fail in achieving peacebuilding aims in northern Uganda'. Based on a framework for monitoring peace and conflict impacts of the PCDP/PRDP, Alert undertook this research by developing and applying a set of peace and conflict indicators (PCIs). By doing so, it aims to demonstrate the peace dividends accruing to the implementation of the PRDP and the PCDP.

This study presents comparative findings from 2011 baseline and 2012 re-run surveys in Acholi and Lango sub-regions. It constitutes the first round of monitoring in a time series – tracing the peace and conflict impacts of the PRDP over a period of years. Due to their position at the epicentre of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency, Acholi and Lango sub-regions have been primary targets for government and development partner interventions in northern Uganda's recovery process. Classified as directly affected under the PRDP framework, these regions have acute peacebuilding, recovery and development needs. Wide-ranging challenges identified by the ACCS include: lack of economic opportunities; limited local capacity for engaging in productive activities; social and familial instability; perceptions of neglect and marginalisation; and limited access to basic social services. In Acholi sub-region alone, over 90% of the population was displaced for over a decade during the insurgency.

Since the cessation of hostilities, the vast majority of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to their homes, in both regions. However, returns have outpaced recovery planning and implementation; most IDPs have returned to areas offering few basic services, particularly in rural areas. Moreover, new and escalating forms of conflict have arisen. Land disputes and competition over resources pose a serious threat to the sustainability of the current peace. Furthermore, the social fabric of Acholi and Lango sub-regions has been fundamentally altered by the war. Relationships between individuals and communities are marked by tension, and people are still dealing with the psycho-social impact of conflict. It is such challenges that the PRDP/



PCDP interventions intend to tackle, thus making the regions central to the monitoring aims of this research.

## Methodology

The research combined a quantitative perceptions survey, qualitative consensus panel interviews and a secondary literature review. It covered a total of six districts: four in Acholi (Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum and Lamwo) and two in Lango (Lira and Otuke). The perceptions survey returns totalled 1,031 respondents in 2011 and 1,136 respondents in 2012. The qualitative panels were conducted as facilitated roundtable discussions that involved on average six to eight individuals at district, sub-county and community (parish) levels. Qualitative data was predominantly obtained in 2012, as the 2011 baseline consisted of primarily quantitative data collection. The 2012 qualitative data collection yielded a total of 146 respondents (57 at district level, 48 at sub-county level and 41 at parish level).

## Key findings

### Confidence in sustained peace and security

Comparing 2011 and 2012 results, across sub-regions, there was a 6.6 percentage point decrease in the number of respondents reporting confidence in sustained peace and security, from 79.3% in 2011 to 72.7% in 2012. In Acholi, there was a 9.4 percentage point reduction in the proportion of respondents who reported confidence in sustained peace, from 79.2% in 2011 to 69.8% in 2012. In Lango, there was a 0.6 percentage point reduction in respondents with confidence in sustained peace and security, from 79.3% to 78.7%. Results showed that large proportions of respondents in both years had been involved in conflict at a personal level. In 2011, 41.9% overall had been involved in conflict within the two years preceding the survey; and in 2012, 40.1% reported the same.

Land-related disputes were by far the most common problem area, with similar proportions in both years (62.7% in 2011 and 62% in 2012). Domestic violence and theft were also common. Tracking percentage change between 2011 and 2012, domestic violence increased in prevalence by 5.2 percentage points and theft of property decreased by 6.4 percentage points. There were strong socio-economic drivers underlying the conflicts identified. Land disputes were attributed to the increasing commercialisation of land in a context of insecure land tenure and the competing claims of returnees for whom land constitutes the only asset. Domestic violence and theft were associated with high levels of economic insecurity, youth unemployment and alcoholism.

In addition to socio-economic drivers, psycho-social symptoms of the war were apparent in the findings. The inter-personal nature of continuing conflicts – between husband and wife, neighbours, and people from different localities – implied that the absence of war has given way to pernicious forms of violence that threaten the social fabric of post-conflict regions like Acholi and Lango. Reconciliation has not taken place and people are still dealing with the psychological effects of the war and its memories.

### Local government responsiveness to community needs

Across sub-regions, there was an increase of 10.6 percentage points in the number of respondents reporting that they were satisfied with local government responsiveness to community needs – from 43.6% in 2011 to 54.2% in 2012. In Acholi, there was an increase of 11.5 percentage points, from 43.6% in 2011 to 55.1% in 2012. In Lango, there was an increase of 8.8 percentage points, from 43.7% to 52.5%. Despite the increment, overall satisfaction levels with local

government responsiveness to community needs left significant room for improvement. Pervasive resource and funding limitations were considered to be severely inhibiting service delivery. Gaps in the provision of resources and funding were seen to be affecting the health sector in particular, where shortages in staff and medical supplies are driving negative perceptions of government responsiveness to community needs.

In both years, the majority of participants in all six districts had not participated in local government planning activities. Across years and districts, participation levels averaged at 16.7%. Gulu district presented both the highest and lowest participation levels across years, at 18.7% in 2011 dropping to 14.6% in 2012. Female respondents presented considerably lower levels of participation than men. Such limited involvement raises challenges, including lack of ownership on the part of communities towards the services provided to them, which, in turn, threatens their sustainability.

In addition to limited community engagement in the determination of services, the study identified participation and accountability gaps that were fuelling discontent at local government levels. Officials expressed frustration and feelings of disempowerment due to the PRDP activities being controlled centrally – leaving local government unable to meaningfully engage in project planning, implementation and monitoring. Exacerbating such challenges were allegations of corruption – resulting in sub-standard infrastructure, perceptions of neglect and a general lack of trust in government and local authorities among the communities.

### Conflict-resolution mechanisms

Across years in both Acholi and Lango, the large majority of respondents who had been involved in a conflict within the two years preceding the survey reported their case through either an official or informal mechanism (86.3% in 2011 and 85.7% in 2012). The most common mechanism being used to resolve cases was the local council/councillor (LC) system in both years. However, it was more popular in 2011 (47.7%) than in 2012 (40.7%). The clan system was the second most commonly used mechanism, increasing in popularity from 24.9% in 2011 to 31.2% in 2012.

Findings indicated that people respond well to conflict-resolution mechanisms that are integrated at community level and incorporate traditional methods. However, the ability of these mechanisms to support sustained peace and security by effectively resolving community disputes remains in question. Principal among the challenges that arose from the findings were capacity and funding gaps, thus resulting in inefficient and often corrupt systems.

Analysis also pointed towards an apparent clash between formal and informal mechanisms, and retributive and restorative justice. In some instances, communities were using two parallel conflict-resolution structures – formal and customary – simultaneously. But, rather than operating through integrated approaches, communities appeared to be using the two structures against each other. The management of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and land conflicts was notable in this regard. Such methods lead to systems becoming subverted for personal gain, an approach that threatens the influence and legitimacy of both informal and formal structures.

### Access to economic opportunities

In Acholi, there was an increase of 13.7 percentage points in the proportion of respondents perceiving they have access to sufficient economic opportunities. In Lango, there was a slightly larger increase of 14.6 percentage points. Across both regions, there was an overall increase of 14.2 percentage points, from 29.8% in 2011 to 44% in 2012. Thus, despite the increment, the perception of having access to sufficient economic opportunities remained a minority view in 2012. In 2011 only 6.4% of the respondents reported having sufficient income to sustain their

households. In 2012 this increased to 13.3%. Such results are a cause for concern and point towards the inability of the two regions' primary economic activity – crop farming – to sustain households. In the qualitative findings, it was observed that rural communities are lagging behind towns and trading centres, despite the recognition that there is great potential for increased economic opportunities through development of the agricultural sector. In both sub-regions, there was a strong perception that more needs to be done to convert subsistence farming into a viable income-generating activity for rural communities.

Dissatisfaction towards government programmes and interventions designed to increase economic opportunity were also widespread. Programmes such as the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) and the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) were thought to be too limited in their reach due to inappropriate guidelines and funding limitations. Of primary concern in this context was the selection of beneficiaries, felt to be very few and often not those in most need of support, such as the unemployed youth. Despite the largely youth (18–35 years) demographic (62.3% in 2011 and 54.6% in 2012) in the survey's sample pool, vocational skills training constituted only 1.9% in 2011 and 6.1% in 2012 of the services that respondents reported having been available to them.

Another major challenge cited was access to credit. Despite the majority of respondents reporting personal investment plans alongside widespread presence of financial institutions in the communities surveyed, most respondents were relying on informal channels to access credit. This mismatch between demand and supply implied a failure on the part of lending institutions to find innovative ways of supplying credit to those unable to provide collateral. It also pointed towards the possibility of limited community sensitisation and understanding of how to use these institutions.

## Regional competition and grievances

The majority of respondents presented a sense of disadvantage in comparison to other regions in the country. Specifically, the difference in business vibrancy, infrastructure and the quality of service delivery were felt to illustrate development disparities. Moreover, larger percentages of respondents felt marginalised from government efforts to address imbalances in both years (58.9% in 2011 and 65.8% in 2012).

In the qualitative findings, development disparities between regions were commonly felt to reflect differences in resource allocation. Sentiments of competition and grievances to arise from this had two dimensions. On the one hand, respondents expressed resentment towards regions that had received concentrated recovery and development assistance as a result of having been impacted so severely by the LRA insurgency. On the other hand, respondents conveyed frustration at the coverage of the PRDP assistance beyond those regions that had been directly affected.

Results pointed to a failure on the part of government to sensitise communities on the criteria used in resource allocations under the PRDP and to properly involve them in planning processes. Respondents indicated that they were keen to have the full reality of their needs represented in the PRDP decision-making processes in order to ensure that they receive an equitable share of the resources.

## Key recommendations

### Central government

The central government ought to address the seeds of conflict through putting greater emphasis and resources into the Peacebuilding and Reconciliation (Strategic Objective 4) component of the

PRDP. Building sustainable peace and recovery involves more than the construction of economic infrastructure and consolidation of authority. The PRDP must channel increased resources into the “software” aspects of peacebuilding and recovery. This would include areas of psycho-social support through, for example, maintaining re-integration centres and expanding their services as they cater for those facing psycho-social and economic challenges after being re-integrated into the communities. The much-needed implementation of a comprehensive transitional justice process must also be prioritised.

Increasing sensitisation around the criteria used to allocate the PRDP funds, and ensuring community and local government participation in planning, implementation and monitoring processes are another key factor. Results indicate that the PRDP resource allocations have the potential to incite divisions and competition, especially at the sub-regional level with regard to the PRDP inclusiveness. In order to avoid this divisive impact, allocations must be underpinned by conflict-sensitive approaches. Planning must be inclusive and allocations must be transparent.

### Local government

The local government should address the needs of vulnerable groups more adequately in interventions designed to increase economic opportunities and improve livelihoods. Findings pointed towards the limited reach of government livelihood programmes such as the NUSAF and the NAADS. There was a perception that those who already have the necessary assets and capacity to take advantage of such opportunities are being favoured over a broader spectrum of the less able – and more vulnerable – community members. A critical group, in this regard, are the conflict-affected youth. Strategic Objective 3 (Priority Area 9) of the PRDP II sets out interventions and objectives for improving vocational skills training for the uneducated youth who have grown up in camps, as well as those for improving access to finance and credit, especially for the youth wanting to set up small and medium-sized enterprises. This study has indicated very limited engagement with vocational skills training in the communities surveyed, despite the sample’s predominantly youth demographic. With youth unemployment being identified as a key conflict driver, it is recommended that interventions under Priority Area 9 be closely monitored. This should form part of wider efforts to ensure that vulnerable as well as viable groups are benefiting from economic opportunity and livelihood programmes in conflict-affected regions such as Acholi and Lango.

### Development partners

Development partners should explore alternative options to budget support – for instance, the feasibility of direct support to local governments, or shadow alignment to the local government portion of the budget grant. In the event of providing direct support to local governments, mechanisms that avoid fiduciary risk and promote monitoring and accountability will be critical. Such an approach would therefore necessitate a parallel local government capacity-building programme. The degree to which funds adhere to the additionality principle will also be key. Local government respondents in this research presented significant frustration towards central government’s management of the PRDP, especially in light of recent fund misappropriation. Increasingly decentralised approaches to donor support must be considered.

Development partners ought to further address participation and accountability deficits identified in this study by supporting community structures for the monitoring of the PRDP projects. For instance, donors could strengthen user committees already in existence. Support for innovative demand-side accountability projects, such as those using new technologies, should also be considered. One example is the use of SMS tracking systems to monitor the quality of local government service delivery, such as the Ministry of Health/UNICEF mTrac project.

## Civil society organisations (CSOs)

CSOs should review the National Land Policy to address proposed land reforms concerning customary rights, which is the most prevalent form of land tenure in Acholi and Lango sub-regions. In the validation meeting for this research, participants urged the ACCS to carry out further research on how land rights can be made more secure in Acholi and Lango. Taking advantage of certificates of customary ownership currently being issued by the ministry responsible for lands could be one approach. Securing land rights is also one way of tackling economic insecurity as a significant conflict driver in these regions.

CSOs ought to undertake an analysis of the consultative process used by local authorities in planning activities to establish the extent to which effective participation by the citizenry takes place in the determination of service delivery. Identification of opportunities and strategies for better engagement is crucial. Communities need to play a bigger role in service delivery and budget prioritisation. As part of the state-building process, communal identities can be fostered and social divisions diffused in the way communities account for common facilities.

In future, the PRDP monitoring should place greater emphasis on identifying existing accountability mechanisms and structures being used at the grassroots level – for instance, user committees that help local government supervise the implementation of projects. Such structures can be strengthened as one way of addressing the accountability and participation gaps identified in this research.

There is a need to carry out further research into the effect of corruption on the peace and conflict impacts of the PRDP. In light of developing revelations of the PRDP fund misappropriation in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) – alongside the identification of corruption as a primary challenge to northern Uganda's recovery process in this study – it is recommended that the CSO should evaluate the existing funding mechanisms and assess the effectiveness of current accountability structures governing the PRDP resource allocations. On a broader conceptual level, advocacy around corruption as a conflict driver could be considered. This would necessitate further research into the relationship between corruption and conflict, and how corruption affects post-conflict peacebuilding.

Focusing particularly on SGBV and land conflicts, the CSOs should identify and develop a number of hybrid customary/formal approaches to conflict resolution. These can be incorporated into the PRDP peacebuilding aims under Strategic Objective 4, which provides for 'enhancing the roles of community-level mechanisms, taking into account how traditional and formal mechanisms interact'. Findings in this study point towards both synergies and tensions in the way these mechanisms are being applied.

# 1. Introduction

*'Peace is not the absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition of benevolence, confidence, justice.'*

BARUCH SPINOZA

## 1.1 Background

Conflicts between the government of Uganda and rebel groups, particularly Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), lasted for over two decades in the country's northern region. During this time, the people in the region were subjected to prolonged suffering and human rights abuses. Between 1987 and 2006, at least 20,000 Ugandan children were abducted. The LRA often forced its abductees to work as porters, sex slaves or fighters. More than 1.8 million people were displaced from their homes into camps and tens of thousands of Ugandan civilians died. Living conditions in the camps were horrendous. For years, communities were largely cut off from basic necessities, and diseases such as cholera were responsible for more deaths than the conflict itself in some areas.<sup>1</sup>

The signing of a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the government and the LRA in 2006 saw the conflict subside and laid the way for the Juba Peace Talks. The negotiations were abandoned in 2008 without reaching a signed agreement, and the threat posed by Kony and his rebels shifted across Uganda's borders to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic, where he continues to evade capture while terrorising local populations.<sup>2</sup> However, with no recorded incidents of violent confrontation between the government and the LRA within the country's borders since 2005, northern Uganda has now been officially declared a post-conflict region, thus paving the way for recovery and rehabilitation.

Acholi and Lango sub-regions, both classified as directly affected by the conflict under the framework of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP), have acute peacebuilding and reconstruction needs. Wide-ranging challenges identified by the Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS) include: perceptions of neglect and marginalisation; lack of economic opportunities; limited local capacity for engaging in productive activities; social and familial instability; and limited access to basic social services.<sup>3</sup> In Acholi sub-region alone, over 90% of the population was displaced for over a decade during the insurgency. Since the cessation of hostilities, returnees have outpaced recovery planning and implementation; most internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned back to areas offering few basic services, particularly those who have returned to rural areas.<sup>4</sup>

In 2012 phase one of the PRDP came to an end, and in June of that year PRDP II was launched. During its first phase, the Plan was able to make significant advances within the first two strategic objectives (consolidating state authority, and rebuilding and empowering communities). The security situation and strength of state authority in conflict-affected regions was improved,

1 Human Rights Watch [2012]. 'Q&A: Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army'. Available at <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/21/qa-joseph-kony-and-lords-resistance-army/>

2 According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the LRA continues to abduct people in DRC and the Central African Republic, with 66 abductions recorded between July and September 2012 – 20% of them were children. 'Rehabilitation centre for Uganda's LRA returnees to close', *IRIN News*, 18th January 2013. Available at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97276/Rehabilitation-centre-for-Uganda-s-LRA-returnees-to-close/>

3 Refugee Law Project [2011]. *When is it our turn? Conflict risk factors in the garden of PRDP peacebuilding*. Working Paper 1. Kampala: ACCS.

4 Government of Uganda [2012]. *Uganda humanitarian profile 2012*. Available at [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/uganda\\_humanitarian\\_profile\\_\\_2012.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/uganda_humanitarian_profile__2012.pdf)

particularly through an increase in police presence. The building of social infrastructure, such as classrooms and boreholes, also contributed to improving the lives of people living in PRDP regions. However, according to the Plan's mid-term review (MTR), progress across the four objectives was imbalanced, with more progress being made under the first two objectives (consolidation of state authority, and rebuilding and empowering communities) than the third and fourth objectives (revitalisation of the economy, and peace and reconciliation).

Under Strategic Objective 3 (revitalisation of the economy), provision of economic infrastructure (e.g. roads) yielded some positive results. However, scant support was given to farmers and the provision of economic opportunities for the youth was not adequately addressed.

Similarly, the MTR found that interventions under Strategic Objective 4 (peacebuilding and reconciliation) had *'on the whole, been weak. Conflict drivers such as land, youth unemployment and inadequate re-integration of ex-combatants have not been adequately assessed or addressed'*.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, having received less than 3% of the overall PRDP I budget, it is hardly surprising that the peacebuilding aims of Strategic Objective 4 are a long way from being realised.<sup>6</sup>

There is no doubt that the security situation in northern Uganda has dramatically improved in the years since the LRA left the region. However, as was highlighted by one respondent in this research, *'peace is not the absence of war'*.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, studies have continually stressed the need for the PRDP to more appropriately address the economic and psycho-social re-integration and restoration needs of victims of human rights violations, the displaced and ex-combatants. Although the PRDP II sets out objectives more in line with these needs (such as those addressing youth unemployment), its ability to overcome the menacing legacy of the conflicts that beset northern Uganda remains in question.

## 1.2 Research conceptualisation and objectives

As part of Alert's role in the ACCS – monitoring of the extent to which interventions under the PRDP, particularly those funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), succeed or fail in achieving peacebuilding aims – Alert developed a monitoring framework centred on five peace and conflict indicators (PCIs):

- PCI 1: Confidence in sustained peace and security (goal level);
- PCI 2: Responsiveness of local government to community needs;
- PCI 3: Conflict-resolution mechanisms for addressing community-level security and incidence of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV);
- PCI 4: Access to economic opportunity among selected groups; and
- PCI 5: Competition and grievance between PRDP regions, and between the north and south of Uganda.

These perceptions indicators were derived from the DFID/ACCS log frame. They are perceptual in nature and seek to measure the peace and conflict impacts of the Post-Conflict Development Programme (PCDP)/PRDP implementation over a period of years. They respond to a "theory of change" based on implicit assumptions about the peace dividends to be gained across the four outputs of the PRDP. They embody a definition of "positive peace" that is based on meeting

5 Office of the Prime Minister (2011). *Mid-term review of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda*. Draft 7th. Kampala. p.ii.

6 Under the PRDP I, these were organised into two priority programmes: Public Information, Education and Communication (IEC) and Counselling, and De-Mobilisation and Re-integration of Ex-combatants. There was greater regional focus for these programmes on north-central (made up predominantly of Acholi and Lango sub-regions). Strategic Objective 4 of the PRDP II has two priority areas: reintegration and resettlement, and community dispute resolution and reconciliation.

7 Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (May 2012).

people's needs across the areas of governance, human security, economic opportunity and identity, to which these indicators broadly correspond. The theory of change is based on the assumption that the above indicators, when measured, are able to provide necessary conclusions about peace impacts of the PCDP. It is hoped that the impact, influence and leverage of the PCDP/PRDP implementation will result in positive perception change at various levels in the communities of targeted regions. It is these perceptions that Alert is monitoring under different activities of the PCDP/PRDP interventions.

### Objectives of the study:

- As part of the overall aim to create a time series study monitoring the peace and conflict impacts of the PRDP in Acholi and Lango sub-regions, the aim is to comparatively analyse 2011 baseline (Year 1) with 2012 monitoring (Year 2) results for these sub-regions.
- The study also aims to produce one report synthesising, comparing and contrasting Year 1 and Year 2 results, including the conclusions, and policy/advocacy implications that arise from this analysis.



## 2. Confidence in sustained peace and security

This indicator measures perceptions of peace and security, while at the same time providing an insight into the main conflict drivers of the surveyed regions. Respondents were asked whether they had “confidence in sustained peace and security”; and, in order to understand what is driving confidence levels, they were asked a wider set of questions on the security situation in their community. These included the degree to which they had been, or were currently, involved in conflict; the primary security threats to which they are exposed; and their engagement with and/or knowledge of peacebuilding initiatives.

This goal-level indicator is central to the monitoring aims of this research. It gives a fundamental insight into the conflict dynamics of PRDP regions based on people’s understanding of, and engagement with, their environment. By collecting comparative data on a yearly basis, this creates an opportunity to trace the peace and conflict impacts of the PCDP/PRDP interventions in targeted communities. In this context, findings under PCI 1 enable an interpretation of the remaining indicators (local government responsiveness, conflict-resolution mechanisms, economic opportunities, and competition and grievance) from a conflict-analysis perspective. They provide a basis on which to draw parallels between the conflict dynamics of selected sub-regions and these indicators. A most obvious example would be to compare reported security threats under PCI 1 with the effectiveness of conflict-resolution mechanisms under PCI 3. Similarly, how interventions designed to increase economic opportunities addressed under PCI 4 might impact conflict dynamics (through affecting issues such as youth unemployment, alcoholism and competition over resources) is equally important to the monitoring aims of this research.

However, as perceptions indicators, it is important to be conscious of the many factors that influence how people form their opinions. For the PCI 1 findings in Acholi and Lango – regions previously at the epicentre of the LRA insurgency – the degree to which a comparison with the past informs an interpretation of their environment cannot be underestimated. In the context of over two decades of armed conflict and displacement, the prevailing absence of war is driving people’s confidence. As a result, caution is required in over-attributing positive perceptions directly to government/development partner interventions. Despite high levels of confidence in sustained peace and security in these regions, the number of people who reported having been involved in conflict within the last two years, and the types of conflict they have been involved in, point towards the pernicious legacy of war, as well as the fragility of current peace.

These findings will be discussed in the following sections, through a comparison of 2011 and 2012 quantitative and qualitative results.

### 2.1 Confidence in sustained peace and security

Comparing 2011 and 2012 results, across sub-regions, there was a 6.6 percentage point decrease in the number of respondents reporting confidence in sustained peace and security, from 79.3% in 2011 to 72.7% in 2012 (see Table 1).

In Acholi, there was a 9.4 percentage point reduction in the proportion of respondents who reported confidence in sustained peace, from 79.2% in 2011 to 69.8% in 2012. By gender, there was a significant fall in the percentage of male respondents with confidence in sustained peace and security, from 79.3% in 2011 to 68.5% in 2012. In 2011 79.4% of the female respondents had confidence in sustained peace and security, compared with 71% in 2012. The proportion of

respondents aged 35–54 with confidence in sustained peace and security also fell significantly, from 83% in 2011 to 66.8% in 2012. Those with confidence in the 55+ age group fell from 84.7% in 2011 to 63.6% in 2012.

In Lango, there was a 0.6 percentage point reduction in respondents with confidence in sustained peace and security, from 79.3% to 78.7%. There were no statistically significant changes in perceptions among gender and age groups.

**Table 1: Confidence in sustained peace and security by gender and age**

	Acholi				Lango				Total			
	No.	%	RR*	P-Value	No.	%	RR	P-Value	No.	%	RR	P-Value
<b>All</b>												
2011	515/650	79.2	1.00		303/381	79.3	1.00		818/1032	79.3	1.00	
2012	531/761	69.8	0.88 (0.83-0.94)	<0.001	295/375	78.7	0.99 (0.92-1.07)	0.826	826/1136	72.7	0.92 (0.87-0.96)	<0.001
<b>Male</b>												
2011	257/324	79.3	1.00		145/184	78.8	1.00		402/508	79.1	1.00	
2012	259/378	68.5	0.86 (0.79-0.94)	0.001	144/183	79.1	1.00 (0.90-1.12)	0.941	403/560	72.0	0.91 (0.85-0.97)	0.006
<b>Female</b>												
2011	258/325	79.4	1.00		158/198	79.8	1.00		416/523	79.5	1.00	
2012	272/383	71.0	0.89 (0.82-0.97)	0.010	151/193	78.2	0.98 (0.88-1.08)	0.705	423/576	73.4	0.92 (0.86-0.98)	0.017
<b>18–34</b>												
2011	323/415	77.8	1.00		173/225	76.9	1.00		496/640	77.5	1.00	
2012	313/430	72.8	0.94 (0.86-1.01)	0.090	151/190	79.5	1.03 (0.93-1.14)	0.524	464/620	74.8	0.96 (0.91-1.03)	0.268
<b>35–54</b>												
2011	142/171	83.0	1.00		94/112	83.9	1.00		236/283	83.4	1.00	
2012	155/232	66.8	0.80 (0.72-0.90)	<0.001	101/130	77.7	0.92 (0.82-1.04)	0.217	256/362	70.7	0.84 (0.78-0.922)	<0.001
<b>55+</b>												
2011	50/59	84.7	1.00		36/45	80.0	1.00		86/104	82.7	1.00	
2012	63/99	63.6	0.75 (0.62-0.90)	0.002	43/55	78.2	0.97 (0.80-1.20)	0.824	106/154	68.8	0.83 (0.72-0.96)	0.009

\* RR = Relative Ratio

In 2011 a direct question referring to whether respondents had confidence in sustained peace and security was not asked in the qualitative data collection. In 2012 perceptions that *‘the guns are silent, but peace is not here’*<sup>8</sup> and *‘peace is not the absence of war’*<sup>9</sup> reverberated throughout

8 Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (May 2012).

9 Ibid.

the qualitative findings, highlighting the enjoyment of relative peace and security, amidst some apprehension. Panellists emphasised the existence of ‘*minor areas of conflict*’,<sup>10</sup> which threaten the sustainability of current peace. Despite being characterised as ‘*minor*’, one respondent reasoned that ‘*conflict has many levels, and can escalate*’.<sup>11</sup>

Reservations emanated predominantly from the prevalence of land wrangles and border disputes associated with the return of IDPs from camps, but also increased levels of crime and lawlessness, and domestic violence, to the extent that the sentiment ‘*we have peace but we do not have security*’<sup>12</sup> was common in the narratives.

*‘... there is peace in abundance compared with the past [but we are] not quite secure ... there is insecurity now in the communities in the form of land wrangles and theft ...’*<sup>13</sup>

However, this does not mean that the fear of insurgency had disappeared completely. One respondent observed that, as long as Joseph Kony evades capture, confidence in sustained peace will be compromised:

*‘As long as Kony is still alive, people have that psychological issue. For example, we were in Lamwo and the people told us that whenever they hear that Kony is in the forests of South Sudan, they are never at ease.’*<sup>14</sup>

## 2.2 Involvement in conflict

Despite large proportions of respondents who reported having confidence in sustained peace and security in 2011 and 2012, the survey identified high conflict prevalence in both sub-regions. The proportion of people who had been involved in conflict in the two years preceding the surveys was over 40% in both years (see Table 2). In 2011, 41.9% overall had been involved in conflict within the previous two years, and in 2012, 40.1% reported the same.

**Table 2: Involved in conflict in last two years**

Whether involved in conflict	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	429	41.9	455	40.1	884	40.9
No	595	58.1	681	59.9	1,276	59.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,024</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,136</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,160</b>	<b>100</b>

By sub-region, the percentage of respondents involved in conflict in Lango sub-region decreased from 44.4% in 2011 to 36.5% in 2012 (see Figure 1). In Acholi, conflict prevalence remained roughly the same across years, at 40.4% in 2011 and 41.8% in 2012.

<sup>10</sup> Consensus panel, district level, Lira-Lango (June 2012).


<sup>11</sup> Key informant interview (KII), district level, Lamwo-Acholi (June 2012).

<sup>12</sup> Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (May 2012).

<sup>13</sup> KII, Lakang sub-county level, Lamwo-Acholi (June 2012).

<sup>14</sup> Consensus panel, district level, Lira-Lango (June 2012).

Figure 1: Involved in conflict in the last two years by sub-region



### 2.3 Types of conflict


By far, the most prevalent form of dispute in both years was land-related conflict, constituting 62.7% in 2011 and 62% in 2012 of conflicts respondents had been involved in (see Table 3). In 2011 this was followed by theft of property (21.1%) and domestic violence (16.2%). In 2012 domestic violence increased in prevalence, making up 21.4% of the conflicts people had been involved in. In turn, theft of property decreased to the third most prevalent form in 2012 (14.7%).

Table 3: Types of conflict

Type of conflict	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Land conflicts	286	62.7	287	62.0	573	62.4
Domestic violence	74	16.2	99	21.4	173	18.8
Theft of property	96	21.1	68	14.7	164	17.8
Conflicts with local leaders	0	0.0	9	1.9	9	1.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>456</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>919</b>	<b>100</b>

As shown in Figure 2, Acholi and Lango had similar proportions of respondents who had been involved in land conflicts. However, in both years, Acholi had a slightly larger percentage of such respondents (69.6% in 2011 and 65.4% in 2012). Acholi presented particularly high levels of domestic violence in 2011, with 44% of respondents reporting having been involved in this type of conflict. This figure dropped by more than half in 2012, falling to 19.2%. In Lango, however, domestic violence increased in prevalence, from 17.8% in 2011 to 27.7% in 2012. Lango presented particularly high levels of theft in 2011, reported by 30.2% of respondents in this region, compared with 17.3% in Acholi. In 2012 there was a significant decrease of over half in the proportion of respondents involved in theft in Lango, to 14.6%. In Acholi, theft levels remained similar across the years, dropping by 2.2 percentage points to 15.1% in 2012.

Figure 2: Types of conflicts by sub-region




Gender disaggregation showed that male respondents in Acholi sub-region made up larger proportions of those engaged in land conflicts than women: 60.2% men compared with 39.8% women in 2011, and 63.5% men compared with 36.5% women in 2012. In Lango, however, male-female ratios were more equally weighted for land conflicts.

Female respondents constituted the large majority of those reporting experience of domestic violence in both years and regions. In Acholi, they made up 77.3% in 2011 and 83.6% in 2012 of those reporting involvement in domestic violence. In Lango, female respondents constituted 80% in 2011 and 78.9% in 2012 of those reporting involvement in domestic violence. These results are interesting and do not necessarily indicate a greater involvement of women in domestic violence than men. They could point towards a larger proportion of women than men perceiving domestic violence to be a form of conflict, perhaps because they are more often the victims. Findings related to domestic violence will be discussed in more detail below.

In 2011 theft of property affected male respondents to a slightly larger extent than women in Acholi, whereas more females were affected in Lango. However, in 2012 more female respondents than male reported being affected by theft of property in both Acholi and Lango. In 2012 female respondents made up 52.1% in Acholi and 55% in Lango of those affected by theft of property.

Figure 3: Types of conflict by sub-region and by gender



## 2.4 Cause of conflicts

Analysis of 2011 and 2012 results for conflict drivers and causes showed that destruction of boundary markers was the most common reason in both years – constituting 28.8% in 2011 and 33.9% in 2012 of the reasons advanced. In 2011 this was followed by limited access to land (19.9%), people not wanting to work (16%) and unfairness in resource allocation (10.5%). In 2012 destruction of land boundaries was followed by “people claiming that which does not belong to them” (15.3%) and “need to control family finances” (14.5%). Drunkenness/alcohol consumption (11.8%) was mentioned more frequently than people not wanting to work (9.2%) in 2012.

Table 4: Cause of conflicts

Cause	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Destruction of land boundaries	168	28.8	202	33.9	370	31.4
People don't want to work	93	16.0	55	9.2	148	12.6
Drunkenness or alcoholism	58	9.9	70	11.8	128	10.9
Limited access to land or land scarcity	116	19.9	0	0.0	116	9.8
People claiming that which doesn't belong to them	0	0.0	91	15.3	91	7.7
Need to control family finances	0	0.0	86	14.5	86	7.3
Unfairness in resource allocation	61	10.5	0	0.0	61	5.2
Lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities at household level	50	8.6	0	0.0	50	4.2
Power dynamics	37	6.3	0	0.0	37	3.1
Lack of security	0	0.0	30	5.0	30	2.5
Revenge/Vengeance/Bad neighbours	0	0.0	29	4.9	29	2.5
Polygamy	0	0.0	18	3.0	18	1.5
Death of spouse/parent/elder	0	0.0	9	1.5	9	0.8
Not paid for work done	0	0.0	5	0.8	5	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>583</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>595</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,178</b>	<b>100</b>

## 2.5 Conflict actors

In 2011 most conflicts involved a neighbour (31.7%), followed by another member of the community (24.2%), a family member (22.3%) or a clan member (21.8%). In 2012 similar results arose. The most frequently occurring conflict actors were family members (36.3%), neighbours (33.6%) and another person in the community (21.5%).

Table 5: Actors in conflicts

Actors	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Neighbour	115	31.7	153	33.6	268	32.8
Family member	81	22.3	165	36.3	246	30.1
Other person in community	88	24.2	98	21.5	186	22.7
Clan member	79	21.8	39	8.6	118	14.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>363</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>455</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>818</b>	<b>100</b>

In sum, community-level survey results show that large proportions of respondents in both years had been involved in conflict at a personal level. Land-related disputes were by far the most common, with similar proportions in both years. Domestic violence and theft were also common. Tracking percentage change between 2011 and 2012, domestic violence increased in prevalence by 5.2 percentage points, from 16.2% to 21.4%; and theft of property reduced by 6.4 percentage points (see Table 3). In the case of land, the causes and drivers identified by respondents reinforced the typology of conflicts, with destruction of land boundaries appearing as the most frequently mentioned cause in both years (see Table 4). Analysis of the actors involved showed that conflicts were predominantly inter-personal in nature, with neighbours and family members featuring highly (see Table 5). Qualitative findings from panel discussions at district and sub-county levels presented a similar picture. Here, the most frequently mentioned threats to sustained peace and security were land conflicts, followed by crime (commonly in the form of theft) and SGBV/domestic violence.

In order to identify the significance of this conflict typology for the PRDP peace and conflict impacts, each form will be discussed in the following sections through a comparison with broader qualitative findings and relevant secondary sources.

### 2.5.1 Land conflicts

Conflict associated with land has increased substantially following the return of IDPs in Acholi and Lango sub-regions. A primary challenge identified by consensus panel respondents was the disruption to traditional systems of customary land ownership caused by displacement. Alongside the loss of historical land demarcations, fragmentation of families and communities during the period of encampment was felt to have interrupted lines of inheritance.

*‘A lot of separation happened between families upon return. Many men got married to other women during encampment. When time for return came, they decided to separate with the ones they were living with in the camps, eventually leaving them behind including their children. This caused a lot of tension related to land ...’<sup>15</sup>*

Such findings are indicative of broader problems posed by insecure land tenure in northern Uganda, which is based predominantly on undocumented customary rights. In 2006 a study conducted by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) warned that ‘[i]f land tenure and property rights are not addressed as a part of the IDP resettlement and reintegration packages, and if subsequent policy, legislation, and practice does not protect and promote secure land rights for both traditional ethnic groups and individuals, then the seeds of future conflicts can unwittingly be sown’.<sup>16</sup> Increasing commercial interests in the region’s land and natural resources have intensified the potential for insecure tenure to drive conflict. It was argued in the panel discussions that growing realisation at community level of the worth of land is dramatically fuelling disputes. Indeed, for the majority of 1.8 million IDP returnees, land represents the only asset they have after the war. Amuru district presented specific conflict dynamics in this respect. As one panellist reasoned: ‘... *poverty is bringing problems. Land is the only wealth we have and being a source of money, there are a lot of wrangles.*’<sup>17</sup>

In addition to the ongoing ‘*problem of land boundary wrangles with Adjumani district*’<sup>18</sup> over administrative boundaries,<sup>19</sup> commercial interest also appeared to be fuelling insecurity in Amuru. The Madhvani Group’s plan to develop sugarcane production through obtaining over 40,000 hectares of land in Lakang sub-county has been a particular source of contention. There appears

<sup>15</sup> Key informant (KI), district level, Lamwo-Acholi (March 2011).

<sup>16</sup> USAID (2007). ‘Land matters in northern Uganda: Anything goes, anything grows – post-conflict “conflicts” lie in land’. Washington DC.

<sup>17</sup> Consensus panel, sub-county level, Amuru-Acholi (June 2012).

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> For analysis of this ongoing dispute, see: Refugee Law Project (2012). ‘Situation Brief – Border Or Ownership Question: The Apaa Land Dispute’. Kampala: ACCS.



to be a number of competing claims and politicised interests coming into conflict over the land acquisition, which has been linked to oil exploration and discovery in the district. As a result, confusion has arisen in the communities as they attempt to weigh up claims of government-supported illegal land grabbing with the potential economic gains to be made by agricultural investment in the region.<sup>20</sup> In October 2012 local leaders attempted to block the Madhvani Group's investment, accusing Madhvani of using support from President Museveni to forcefully acquire land.<sup>21</sup> However, in the qualitative findings at both Amuru district and sub-county levels, panellists highlighted the local population's desire to attract private investment, while admitting to a great deal of confusion surrounding the intentions of the Madhvani Group.

*'Politics is making us not receive things from the government. Let Madhvani bring his machines to bring employment and income to households. But politicians say government wants to steal our land so we will not benefit from government.'*<sup>22</sup>

The degree to which the rights of local populations are being put at risk by investment schemes such as Madhvani's requires further analysis regarding the potential economic gains to be made by the district in order to ensure that they contribute to inclusive economic growth. This is the case for agricultural commercialisation, as well as oil exploration and discovery.

Other regionally specific dynamics arose in Orom and Lokung sub-counties, where cross-border issues were particularly apparent. It was indicated that some Sudanese elements conduct armed cross-border raids and make claims over ancestral lands belonging to former IDPs on the Uganda side:

*'... Sudanese always penetrate the Uganda border and begin conflict over land ... they beat people and loot our foodstuff ... at the border there are restrictions due to land conflicts with the Sudanese.'*<sup>23</sup>

In regions heavily dependent on agriculture, such as Acholi and Lango, land conflicts threaten not only people's physical security, but also their economic security – thus, the recovery process as a whole. There is compelling evidence from post-conflict situations in Africa that competition for land and natural resources, with no recourse to legal processes, leads to disputes and violence. Such conflicts may erode longstanding local as well as national conflict-resolution practices and, if unchecked, inhibit investment and economic development. People with no access to land, or hopes of resolving disputes over land/resources due to insecure land tenure, are trapped in a cycle of poverty. The potential for violent conflict is intensified if the threat to control land and disenfranchise communities from their rights comes from outside, or the government.<sup>24</sup> As one Acholi leader warned: *'there will be blood on our spears if people from the outside touch our land. We will die over this issue.'*<sup>25</sup> In 2012 alone, it was reported that at least five people were killed in land disputes in Lakang, Apar and Pabbo villages in Amuru district.<sup>26</sup>

## 2.5.2 Domestic violence

Results obtained from panel discussions reflected those that arose from the community-level survey by confirming both the seriousness and prevalence of domestic violence in Acholi and Lango sub-regions. Indeed, physical fighting between partners, frequently over the control of household assets, arose as the most commonly occurring form of SGBV in the qualitative findings.

20 For deeper analysis of the ongoing land dispute in Lakang sub-county, see: Refugee Law Project [2012]. *Situation report – Is it oil, land or investment triggering increasing land dispute in Lakang village of Amuru district?* Kampala: ACCS.

21 Alex Otto. 'Amuru leaders oppose Madhvani sugar project', *The Observer*, 12th October 2012. Available at [http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=21496&Itemid=114/](http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21496&Itemid=114/)

22 Consensus panel, sub-county level, Amuru-Acholi (June 2012).

23 Consensus panel, Lakang sub-county, Lamwo-Acholi (June 2012).

24 USAID (2007). Op. cit.

25 Refer to an 'appeal to policymakers to address land-based conflicts in northern Uganda' by the United Religious Initiative (URI) Great Lakes and the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), 16th October 2012.

26 'Rampant land disputes threaten peace in the north', *The Daily Monitor*, 25th April 2012. Available at <http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/-/691252/1393028/-/format/xhtml/-/2uwfjk/-/index.html>

As with the other forms of conflict identified in Acholi and Lango sub-regions, domestic violence had a strong economic dynamic in both the quantitative and qualitative findings. According to the 2012 community survey results, “poverty” was the second most prevalent cause of SGBV, after “alcohol consumption and drug abuse”, which also featured highly in the qualitative findings. Perceptions of the impact of poverty and alcoholism on SGBV were also presented in the panel discussions:

*‘To me it is because of alcohol consumption, most of the youth are involved in this and some of them even drink together with their parents and I feel it is the main cause of rape in our community.’<sup>27</sup>*

Elsewhere, studies have highlighted high levels of alcohol consumption and its relationship to SGBV and poverty in Uganda. In the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Status Report on Alcohol (2004), Uganda was ranked as the world’s biggest consumer of alcohol (out of 185 countries), with a per capita consumption of 19.47 litres per adult (aged 15 years and above).<sup>28</sup> Similarly, a Ministry of Finance Report from the 2002 Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project emphasised the influence of excessive alcohol consumption on poverty, especially in the rural areas. Alcoholism was found to be the primary factor contributing to the downward mobility of households. Other studies have noted the combined impact of alcoholism on SGBV. In a 2007 study, it was found that 52% of the women who had recently experienced domestic violence in Uganda reported that their partner had consumed alcohol.<sup>29</sup>

Elsewhere in the qualitative findings, the impact of women’s changing roles and responsibilities was highlighted. Women are increasingly managing assets independently of their husbands and, according to respondents, considered to be the main beneficiaries of government livelihood programmes. In the context of homes in which resources are scarce and men are traditionally considered the household heads, tensions have erupted between partners due to women’s developing economic role. It was commonly said that, during the period of crop cultivation, partners remain close and peaceful, only to fall apart following the harvest period, when it is time for selling produce. Conflicts increase as partners struggle to control the proceeds of their work.

*‘Since coming back from the camp, it’s usually women who receive things of which men usually want to go and sell to drink alcohol so it brings violence among families ...’<sup>30</sup>*

Similar arguments around cultural norms and practices were used to explain the prevalence of SGBV. These included perceptions that the ‘introduction of women’s rights’ has led to the breakdown of respect for their husbands/male partners, and thus a justified escalation of violence in the home. It was commonly perceived that women are ‘over-exercising’<sup>31</sup> their rights. Panellists also argued that the role played by women in domestic violence has been underestimated in the gender interventions. In order to ensure a conflict-sensitive approach, it was argued that the women’s empowerment drive needs to have a double entry point targeting both men and women.

*‘... my problem is that the women have been trained but the men are not trained on how to manage SGBV. The women who are trained try to pass this information to their husbands but very little effect has been realised. Therefore, we urge the government and other development partners to provide enough training to men if SGBV is to reduce in the district.’<sup>32</sup>*

27 Consensus panel, Orom sub-county, Kitgum-Acholi (June 2012).

28 WHO (2004). *Global status report on alcohol 2004*. Geneva. pp.11–12.

29 Development, Research and Training (DRT)/Chronic Poverty Research Centre (2007). *Drinking deeper into poverty: The new frontier for chronic poverty in Uganda*. Kampala: DRT.

30 Consensus panel, Awach sub-county, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).

31 Consensus panel, district level, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).

32 Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (June 2012).

It has been reported that nearly 60% of women have experienced some form of physical violence in Uganda. In more than 87% of cases, the perpetrator was a current or former husband or partner.<sup>33</sup> Studies continually point towards wide social acceptance of domestic violence, even by women. It has been found that, despite adequate knowledge and understanding of SGBV and human rights issues, communities continue to harbour harmful values and beliefs that drive it. Based on research in five districts of northern Uganda, Amnesty International has described a “culture of impunity” for cases of rape and sexual assault in the region.<sup>34</sup> Yet, despite pervasive patriarchy, government and non-governmental organisation (NGO) interventions continue to focus mainly on women, excluding men from sensitisation efforts.<sup>35</sup> Indeed, it was found that only 3% of the civil society organisations (CSOs) involved in community mobilisation programmes for changing gender norms actually alter attitudes and behaviour.<sup>36</sup>

Many studies have provided evidence that conflict fuels SGBV. This has been attributed to the fact that traditionally protective and supportive measures and services for people (women, men and children) become undermined in conflict settings. Rape as a weapon of war has also been identified, most notably in DRC. However, the ways in which SGBV manifests itself in post-conflict situations deserves further attention. In the context of the PRDP’s peacebuilding and reconciliation aims, this would necessitate closer analysis of the combined impact of war-induced trauma, poverty and alcoholism on SGBV in northern Uganda. Moreover, the question of whether peace can actually be achieved if these forms of violence continue must be addressed. If sexual violence is a weapon of war that continues in post-conflict situations, is war really over?<sup>37</sup>

### 2.5.3 Theft of property

In support of the community-level survey results, qualitative evidence presented a recurrent fear fuelled by crime, especially theft, at times violent and involving the use of arms. In Amach sub-county, one panellist questioned ‘*how can there be peace when people come from far and back you then run off with your property?*’<sup>38</sup> Particularly worrying were testimonies in the Acholi narratives of youths colluding with “thugs” from different districts, implying that crime could be taking on an organised nature in the region. Indeed, one respondent described those carrying out this activity as ‘*organised criminals*’.<sup>39</sup>

*‘... it’s true the guns have fallen silent, but that indeed doesn’t mean that we are at peace, often I have heard on our radio and in our newspapers that people get robbed at night, some people rob others and others die in the process, so there is a general level of lawlessness that has cropped up since the guns have gone ...’*<sup>40</sup>

In regions where the experience of displacement has been so widespread, increasing levels of violent crime were commonly attributed to male youth, considered a ‘*lost generation*’ due to having grown up in IDP camps. As a result, they were thought to have lacked both the formal education and morally instructive upbringing of former generations who grew up in more homogeneous communities. Largely uneducated and unemployed, this ‘*lost generation*’ was considered vulnerable to falling into criminal activity and capable of posing a significant threat to sustained peace and security. This impression was subset within wider acknowledgement that rising levels of theft and crime are directly attributable to socio-economic challenges associated with high poverty levels and unemployment:

33 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘Social institutions and gender index: Uganda, 2012’. Available at <http://genderindex.org/country/uganda/>

34 Amnesty International (2007). *Uganda: Justice system fails victims of sexual abuse*. London.

35 M.K. Kasembe (2011). *Gender-based violence in the Republic of Uganda: A situation analysis report* (Vol. I). Kampala: Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development/United Nations Development Fund for Women. p.xiv.

36 Ibid.

37 See: International Alert (2010). *War is not over yet: Community perceptions of sexual violence and its underpinnings in eastern DRC*. London.

38 Consensus panel, Amach sub-county, Lira-Lango (June 2012).

39 Consensus panel, Awach sub-county, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).

40 Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (May 2012).

*‘... this kind of poverty is what contributes to violence, people robbing each other, and also conflicts over land ... the mindset of our youth who are facing economic challenges like unemployment, and so many others, which results usually in robbery and things like stealing of farm produce from gardens.’<sup>41</sup>*

Similar findings have been made elsewhere by the ACCS in Acholi sub-region. Recent analysis in Kitgum district has identified the threat posed by ‘growing numbers of unemployed and uneducated youth that have turned to crime and substance abuse, with growing evidence of gang-like behaviour and an increase in crime and violence’.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, as the country with the largest youth population in the world (per capita),<sup>43</sup> studies have commonly highlighted the destabilising potential of Uganda’s demographic “youth bulge”. A recent United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) conflict analysis in the country found this demographic to carry ‘significant grievances’ relating to perceptions of political marginalisation and manipulation. With those under the age of 30 constituting 80% of the country’s unemployed,<sup>44</sup> such grievances have strong socio-economic underpinnings.

Other common drivers were reported as a lack of sufficient punitive and thus deterrent measures for criminals. This was due to perceptions that security and police services are under-resourced, therefore less able to respond to crimes effectively and more prone to corruption. A common example was the solicitation of obligatory facilitation fees for fuel to enable police officers to respond to crimes. The improvement of security infrastructure under the PRDP through, for example, increasing the number of police posts was therefore challenged by a recurrent perception that the resources required to operate and maintain these services are not available. These results will be discussed in further detail under PCI 3 (conflict-resolution mechanisms for addressing community-level security).

This section has looked at the three most common forms of conflict reported by respondents in the 2011 and 2012 surveys. The dynamics of each – land disputes, domestic violence and theft of property – have been discussed through a comparison with the qualitative findings and relevant secondary literature. It is apparent from these findings that “peace” – in terms of a community free from recurrent threats to its physical and economic security – is far from being achieved in Acholi and Lango sub-regions. In order to identify ways in which the PRDP could more effectively contribute to reducing these threats, the next section will analyse perceptions of peacebuilding initiatives through a comparison of 2011 and 2012 quantitative and qualitative results.

## 2.6 Peacebuilding initiatives

Respondents in both years were able to identify a number of peacebuilding initiatives in their community. In 2011 (26.7%) and 2012 (31.7%), community sensitisation was the most frequently mentioned initiative. Comparing those results that appeared in both years, community sensitisation was followed by mediation, constituting 6.3% of the responses in 2011 and 13.7% in 2012. Psycho-social support comprised 2.4% of the initiatives mentioned in 2011 and 3.8% in 2012. Resettlement assistance was the least frequently mentioned response that occurred in both years, and fell from 2.3% in 2011 to 1.1% in 2012.

<sup>41</sup> Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (June 2012).

<sup>42</sup> Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS) (2012). *Northern Uganda conflict analysis* (Draft). Kampala. p.92.

<sup>43</sup> 79% of its population is under the age of 30. See: A. Knutzen and A. Smith (2012). *Uganda conflict analysis*. Kampala: UNICEF. p.7.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* p.7.

**Table 6: Peacebuilding initiatives in the community**

Initiative	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Community sensitisation	588	26.7	631	31.7	1,219	29.1
Community dialogue	478	21.7	0	0.0	478	11.4
Community policing	0	0.0	425	21.4	425	10.1
Mediation	138	6.3	272	13.7	410	9.8
Construction of police posts	0	0.0	280	14.1	280	6.7
Patrols by security agencies	0	0.0	240	12.1	240	5.7
Rehabilitation and development projects	226	10.3	0	0.0	226	5.4
Peace training	155	7.0	0	0.0	155	3.7
Sensitisation through youth drama groups	146	6.6	0	0.0	146	3.5
Customary cultural dispute resolution	133	6.0	0	0.0	133	3.2
Psycho-social support	53	2.4	76	3.8	129	3.1
Conflict-resolution skill training	96	4.4	0	0.0	96	2.3
Amnesty law	76	3.5	0	0.0	76	1.8
Resettlement	51	2.3	21	1.1	72	1.7
Sensitisation through youth SACCO* groups	62	2.8	0	0.0	62	1.5
Demining	0	0.0	43	2.2	43	1.0
Community peace committee	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,202</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,988</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>4,190</b>	<b>100</b>

\* The youth saving and credit cooperatives organisation, also referred to as “saving and credit cooperatives associations” and sometimes “saving and credit cooperatives groups”. These loose associations have been used by community-based organisations and youth themselves as an entry point to raise awareness about peace, livelihoods, good moral standing in society, etc.

## 2.7 “Hardware” v “software” approaches to peacebuilding

In the qualitative findings, there was a general sense that the PRDP had focused on the “hardware” components of peacebuilding, such as economic infrastructure, to the disadvantage of “software” elements, such as those involved in reconciliation and re-integration. Respondents in both years felt that more resources could be allocated to the PRDP’s peacebuilding aims under Strategic Objective 4. For example, the need to improve the capacity of local conflict-resolution mechanisms to deal with community-level conflict featured highly, particularly through the recognition and integration of traditional systems. Similarly, it was felt that more needed to be done to ensure follow-up and monitoring of community-level assistance in the areas of psycho-social support and management of SGBV. The predominant sentiment was that, although the ‘*guns are silent*’, the effects of a long armed war are still felt strongly. As has been identified in the examination of conflicts reported in this section, increasing levels of violence, crime and SGBV were associated with the effects of camp life, amid stresses connected with economic deprivation and unemployment, as well as the psycho-social impact of war. In this context, interventions targeting “software aspects” such as “the mindsets of the people” require as much attention as infrastructure.

*'Now the war has gone, but we are still feeling the effects ... We are mechanically recreating the society to go back to normal ... So we have to battle with things that are coming up now ... this domestic violence is really a part of the psycho-social effects of the war and the poverty attendant to recovery ... There is a lot of impatience but a lot of it is secluded around the effects of the war, the trauma people went through and then the challenge of survival.'*<sup>45</sup>

Indeed, the need to place greater emphasis on peacebuilding processes, such as those involved in reparation, re-integration and restoration, after such long periods of displacement and conflict has been frequently stressed in related studies. In 2010 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) warned of the 'absence of meaningful action to address land-based conflict and re-integration in the Acholi sub-region'.<sup>46</sup> Similarly, the 2011 MTR of the PRDP concluded that interventions under its "Peacebuilding and Reconciliation" component (Strategic Objective 4) have, 'on the whole, been weak. Conflict drivers such as land, youth unemployment and inadequate re-integration of ex-combatants have not been adequately assessed or addressed.'<sup>47</sup>

As of January 2013, only two reception centres for the re-integration of former combatants remained in northern Uganda, one of which was threatened with closure. Services offered by these centres directly address the needs of those who have been affected by the conflict (many as a result of abduction), including assessment and treatment for trauma, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety and sexually transmitted diseases. Their closure, therefore, greatly reduces the support available to former combatants. In addition, the centres have provided material assistance and capacity development in order to improve the ability of returnees to engage in productive economic activities. After re-integration, they have served as referral points for women and girls seeking access to other services and agencies.<sup>48</sup>

Research has identified an unmet need for psycho-social services among former LRA child soldiers in northern Uganda. In a 2008 study, it was found that 55.9% of the former combatants questioned<sup>49</sup> suffered from symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and 87.3% reported having experienced 10 or more war-related traumatic psychological events.<sup>50</sup> With regard to the impact of centres on children's rehabilitation and re-integration, the Institute for Security Studies has found that children who spent time in centres have better mental health and psycho-social wellbeing compared with children who return directly to communities.<sup>51</sup>

In 2012 the Refugee Law Project commented on a 'great concern that the PRDP I did not address the reparation needs of the local people who suffered direct physical and psychological injuries of the conflicts, to aid them to heal and recover from the two decades of the LRA insurgency'.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, the Uganda Human Rights Commission has recently reported, jointly with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, that the government has made no concerted effort to document, investigate and provide victims with access to relevant information concerning the violations they were exposed to and suffered. According to the study, the overwhelming majority of victims of serious violations have so far been denied their 'internationally acknowledged right to remedy and reparation'.<sup>53</sup>

45 KI, district level, Lamwo-Acholi (June 2012).

46 IOM (2010). *Land or else: Land-based conflict, vulnerability and disintegration in northern Uganda*. Kampala. p.6.

47 Office of the Prime Minister (2011). *Op. cit.* p.ii.

48 'Rehabilitation centre for Uganda's LRA returnees to close', *IRIN News*, 18th January 2013. Available at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97276/Rehabilitation-centre-for-Uganda-s-LRA-returnees-to-close/>

49 58 girls and 44 boys.

50 E. Ovuga, T.O. Oyok and E.B. Moro (2008). 'Post-traumatic stress disorder among former child soldiers attending a rehabilitative service and primary school education in northern Uganda', *African Health Sciences*, Vol. 8, No. 3. pp.136-41. Available at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19357739/>

51 A. Veale and A. Stavrou (2003). *Violence, reconciliation and identity: The reintegration of the Lord's Resistance Army child abductees in northern Uganda*. ISS Monograph No. 92. Ch. 3. Institute for Security Studies.

52 Refugee Law Project (2012). *'PRDP II: What needs to change?' Views from Te-Yat*. Briefing Note. Kampala: RLP ACCS. p.3.

53 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Uganda (2007). *Returning to uncertainty: Addressing vulnerabilities in northern Uganda*. Kampala p.xx.

To summarise, comparing 2011 and 2012 results, in Acholi, there was a 9.4 percentage point reduction in the proportion of respondents who reported confidence in sustained peace and security, from 79.2% in 2011 to 69.8% in 2012 (see Table 1). In Lango, there was a 0.6 percentage point reduction, from 79.3% to 78.7%. However, despite relatively high levels of confidence in sustained peace and security, results showed that large proportions of respondents in both years had been involved in conflict at a personal level. In 2011 41.9% overall had been involved in conflict within the two years preceding the survey; and in 2012, 40.1% reported the same (see Table 2).

### 3. Local government responsiveness to community needs

Analysts are increasingly recognising the role of basic service delivery in post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding. Improved and equitable access to basic services such as education, water and health can help prevent conflict, or may provide an opportunity for broader transformation, such as longer-term “pro-poor” political and economic change. The provision of basic services can contribute towards breaking the inter-generational cycle of poverty, increasing economic opportunity and diffusing social tensions.<sup>54</sup> It is, therefore, an important way of addressing perceptions of marginalisation and exclusion among certain groups. It is also particularly valuable in terms of sustaining peace dividends gained in the early stages of recovery.<sup>55</sup> With education as an example, recent analysis in Uganda has pointed to the importance of extending and improving provision in conflict areas in order to ‘demonstrate a return to normality and ability of the state to provide services for the public good’.<sup>56</sup> If managed appropriately, basic service delivery in post-conflict environments can contribute significantly to the peacebuilding agenda.

In the context of Acholi and Lango sub-regions, particular challenges have been posed by long-term reliance on humanitarian aid, which has driven a degree of dependency on outside assistance in the region. With the withdrawal of this support since the cessation of hostilities, gaps have appeared in service provision. Added to this is the severely damaging impact conflict has had on indigenous infrastructure and delivery systems, alongside processes of decentralisation that have led to the establishment of several new districts with limited capacities. In such settings of weakened governance structures, sparse resources and habitual dependency, ‘services can be controlled and manipulated, thus creating or exacerbating horizontal inequalities and fuelling discontent’.<sup>57</sup> If managed inappropriately, service delivery can contribute to destabilising a post-conflict environment by inciting social divisions, as much as it can contribute to sustaining its peace. Indeed, imbalances in government service provision were commonly associated with feelings of competition and grievance in this study’s findings. Respondents perceived better service delivery in other localities and regions as evidence that the government favoured them.

In order to avoid the potentially destabilising role service delivery can have in post-conflict settings, addressing governance arrangements to ensure that planning and delivery systems involve citizen participation is equally important to the peacebuilding agenda. By reinforcing communal identities through participation in state processes and governance structures, inclusive planning systems form an integral part of the state-building process at local and national levels. As has been argued in a previous study on the recovery process in northern Uganda, ‘a community learns and grows in how they account for common facilities’.<sup>58</sup> Indeed, another positive outcome of participatory planning structures is community ownership of the services provided to them, which, in turn, increases their sustainability. Moreover, inclusive planning and delivery systems require a thorough understanding of the conflict dynamics at sub-national levels. Service delivery interventions, therefore, make it possible to address the *root causes* of fragility and conflict as well as its symptoms.<sup>59</sup> Whether for good or bad, the role of local government in basic service delivery ‘lies at the nexus of Peace-building, State building, and recovery’.<sup>60</sup> Basic services should be understood as peace dividends in themselves; governance arrangements to ensure inclusive planning and delivery systems deserve equal attention.

54 OECD (2008). *Service delivery in fragile situations: Key concepts, findings and lessons*. Paris: OECD/DAC Discussion Paper Series. p.21.

55 A. Dabo et al (2010). *Local governance, peace-building and state-building* (Draft). New York: UNDP. p.15.

56 A. Knutzen and A. Smith (2012). *Uganda conflict analysis*. Kampala: UNICEF. p.9.

57 E. McCandles (2012). *Peace dividends and beyond: Contributions of administrative and social services to peace building*. New York: United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. p.1.

58 Refugee Law Project (2011). *Op. cit.* p.24.

59 OECD (2008). *Op. cit.* p.21.

60 A. Dabo et al (2010). *Op. cit.* p.15.



In light of these arguments, the PCI 2 results focus on how local governments determine service delivery priorities and the extent to which those priorities respond to community needs. In accordance with the PCDP/PRDP priority areas, focus is placed on the areas of health, education and professional/vocational skills training. Perceptions collected at individual and community level present how the aspirations of citizens, and the community as a whole, are reflected in local government priorities, budget allocations and services. This was a general indicator; the pertinent questions were posed to all respondents in the survey. Both 2011/12 qualitative and quantitative results are presented.

### 3.1 Local government responsiveness to community needs

Across sub-regions, there was an increase of 10.6 percentage points in the number of respondents reporting that they were satisfied with local government responsiveness to community needs, from 43.6% in 2011 to 54.2% in 2012 (see Table 7). In Acholi, there was an increase of 11.5 percentage points, from 43.6% in 2011 to 55.1% in 2012. In Lango, there was an increase of 8.8 percentage points, from 43.7% to 52.5%.

Reaching an average of 54.2% across regions in 2012, despite the increment, overall satisfaction levels with local government responsiveness to community needs left significant room for improvement.

By gender, there was an increase in male respondents reporting satisfaction with local government responsiveness to community needs, from 45.5% in 2011 to 53.6% in 2012. Among female respondents, the increase was more significant, from 41.8% in 2011 to 54.9% in 2012.


Among age groups, according to the p-value (0.001), the most significant increase in satisfaction with local government responsiveness was in the 35–54 age group, from 39.6% in 2011 to 52.5% in 2012.

Table 7: Local government responsiveness to community needs by gender and age

	Acholi				Lango				Total			
	No.	%	RR	P-Value	No.	%	RR	P-Value	No.	%	RR	P-Value
<b>All</b>												
2011	282/647	43.6	1.00		166/380	43.7	1.00		448/1027	43.6	1.00	
2012	419/761	55.1	1.26 (1.13- 1.41)	<0.001	197/375	52.5	1.20 (1.04- 1.40)	0.015	616/1136	54.2	1.24 (1.14- 1.36)	<0.001
<b>Male</b>												
2011	147/324	45.4	1.00		83/182	45.6	1.00		230/506	45.5	1.00	
2012	211/378	55.8	1.23 (1.06- 1.43)	0.007	89/182	48.9	1.07 (0.86- 1.33)	0.529	300/560	53.6	1.18 (1.04- 1.33)	0.009
<b>Female</b>												
2011	135/323	41.8	1.00		83/198	41.9	1.00		218/521	41.8	1.00	
2012	208/383	54.3	1.30 (1.11- 1.52)	0.001	108/193	56.0	1.33 (1.09- 1.64)	0.006	316/576	54.9	1.31 (1.31- 1.67)	<0.001
<b>18-34</b>												
2011	187/413	45.3	1.00		116/224	51.8	1.00		303/637	47.6	1.00	
2012	242/430	56.3	1.24 (1.09- 1.42)	0.002	107/190	56.3	1.09 (0.91- 1.30)	0.356	349/620	56.3	1.18 (1.06- 1.32)	0.002
<b>35-54</b>												
2011	73/171	42.7	1.00		39/112	34.8	1.00		112/283	39.6	1.00	
2012	125/232	53.9	1.26 (1.02- 1.56)	0.030	65/130	50.0	1.44 (1.06- 1.95)	0.021	190/362	52.5	1.33 (1.11- 1.58)	0.001
<b>55+</b>												
2011	20/59	33.9	1.00		11/44	25.0	1.00		31/103	30.1	1.00	
2012	52/99	52.5	1.55 (1.04- 2.32)	0.033	25/55	45.5	1.82 (1.01- 3.27)	0.046	77/154	50.0	1.66 (1.19- 2.32)	0.003

By district, Gulu (60.7%) had the highest level of satisfaction across years, increasing by 15.2 percentage points, from 45.5% in 2011 to 60.7% in 2012 (see Figure 4). It therefore also presented one of the largest increments in satisfied respondents. Amuru, increasing by 17.7 percentage points, from 35.2% in 2011 to 52.9% in 2012, had the largest increase in satisfied respondents. This was followed by Lira, where there was an increase of 16.5 percentage points, from 41.5% to 58%.

Figure 4: Local government responsiveness to community needs by district



Comparing those results that appeared in both years (see Table 8), the most frequently mentioned reasons advanced by respondents who felt satisfied with local government responsiveness to community needs were improved education (12.9% in 2011 and 25.4% in 2012), followed by better health services (11.7% in 2011 and 20.6% in 2012), and improved security, which featured more prevalently in 2011 (13.6%) than in 2012 (11.9%). As primary education was the most prominent service extended to the respondents in both years, it is not surprising that its improvement would be the most frequently advanced reason for satisfaction with local government responsiveness across years.

Table 8: Satisfaction with local government responsiveness

Area of satisfaction	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Improved education	417	12.9	441	25.4	858	16.8
Improved health services	377	11.7	358	20.6	735	14.4
Improved security	439	13.6	206	11.9	645	12.6
Brings justice to committed crimes	368	11.4	0	0.0	368	7.2
Prevents crime in community	365	11.3	0	0.0	365	7.1
Protects my interests	211	6.6	0	0.0	359	7.0
Protects family and community	318	9.9	0	0.0	318	6.2
Improved quality of life	274	8.5	0	0.0	274	5.4
Reduced poverty	259	8.0	0	0.0	259	5.1
Provides agricultural aid	0	0.0	257	14.8	257	5.0
Builds and maintains	0	0.0	234	13.5	234	4.6
Water services	0	0.0	216	12.4	216	4.2
Creates employment	193	6.0	0	0.0	193	3.8
Credit services	0	0.0	26	1.5	26	0.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,221</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,738</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>5,107</b>	<b>100</b>

Across years and sub-regions, poor education services (18.7% in 2011 and 21.5% in 2012) was the reason advanced most frequently by respondents who were dissatisfied with local government responsiveness to community needs (see Table 9). This was closely followed by poor health services, and poor agricultural services. In 2012 poor health services (25.5%) appeared as the most prevalent reason for dissatisfaction. In 2011 poor agricultural services (19.3%) was the most commonly advanced reason.


**Table 9: Dissatisfaction with local government responsiveness**

Area of dissatisfaction	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Poor education services	263	18.7	215	21.5	478	19.9
Poor health services	205	14.6	255	25.5	460	19.1
Poor agricultural services	271	19.3	172	17.2	443	18.4
Poor road maintenance	116	8.3	150	15.0	266	11.1
Provision of income-generating activities to groups	259	18.4	0	0.0	259	10.8
Boreholes	138	9.8	0	0.0	138	5.7
Water services	0	0.0	114	11.4	114	4.7
Poor resettlement plans	73	5.2	28	2.8	101	4.2
Security	0	0.0	46	4.6	46	1.9
Conflict-resolution skill training	33	2.4	0	0.0	33	1.4
Psycho-social support/ counselling returnees and ex-combatants	25	1.8	0	0.0	25	1.0
Community peace training initiatives	21	1.5	0	0.0	21	0.9
Government commitment	0	0.0	20	2.0	20	0.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,404</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,000</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,404</b>	<b>100</b>

Looking at education services specifically, across years and districts, Otuke had the highest proportion of respondents who felt dissatisfied, with 58.7% holding this perception in 2011 (see Figure 5). This fell to 42.4% in 2012, which constituted the second-highest level of dissatisfaction in 2012, after Amuru (51.1%). It also meant that Otuke presented the largest shift in the proportion of respondents who felt dissatisfied with education services, with a drop of 16.3 percentage points between 2011 and 2012.


The level of dissatisfaction increased in Lamwo, Gulu and Amuru, while it decreased in the remaining districts. Lamwo presented the sharpest increase of 11.7 percentage points in dissatisfied respondents. In Gulu, levels of dissatisfaction increased by 4.5 percentage points and in Amuru by 3.5 percentage points.

Figure 5: Dissatisfaction with education services by district



With regards to health services, Otuke again presented particularly high levels of dissatisfaction. It held the highest proportion of dissatisfied respondents in both years, rising from 47.9% in 2011 to 59.6% in 2012 (see Figure 6). In Lira and Amuru, levels remained similar across the years. However, in Gulu, Kitgum and Lamwo, the proportion of respondents who were dissatisfied with health services all rose considerably. Lamwo presented the steepest increase of 33.6 percentage points, from 20% in 2011 to 53.6% in 2012.

Figure 6: Dissatisfaction with health services by district



Due to its direct engagement with local government officials, at district and sub-county levels, qualitative evidence gained in panel discussions offered particularly important insights in relation to the community-level results. On the one hand, local government representatives supported findings of community dissatisfaction by affirming their awareness of it, as well as partially validating it by admitting to service provision gaps and their own capacity deficiencies. On the other hand, they were able to offer a defence of such deficiencies and, in so doing, an additional layer of insight.

The most common argument advanced by panel respondents in this respect was restrictions on their ability to respond to community needs due to funding/resource limitations, commonly blamed on conditions and constraints imposed by central government. It was appreciated that the PRDP had contributed to the development of social infrastructure – schools and health centres have been built – but the resources required to run and sustain them were considered unavailable.

Such deficiencies led panellists to characterise services as ‘*mere structures*’.<sup>61</sup> This was seen particularly in the case of staff shortages, but also a lack of medication in health centres and even amenities such as water and electricity in hospitals and schools. Limited budget allocations from central government resulted in feelings of marginalisation, and service delivery was characterised as centrally dictated, rather than demand-driven.

*‘... they have been raising complaints at the parish level, either because of a lack of drugs or even the staff itself. You will find that in one health facility there is only one member of staff.’*

*‘... this is really frustrating ... in relation to the hospital there are things lacking in the maternity wing for safe motherhood or delivery ... even the children’s wards are not there ...’<sup>62</sup>*

The health sector was of notable dissatisfaction to respondents. In line with such negative results, recent analysis has described the sector in Uganda as a ‘specific example of ambiguous government commitment to basic services’.<sup>63</sup> Low staffing levels are of particular concern. In its 2011/2012 Performance Report, the Ministry of Health noted that 45% of approved positions in the public health sector remain vacant. Just over half (55%) of the total national staffing requirement (for all 111 districts and Kampala City Council) is therefore currently filled.<sup>64</sup> The government’s Health Sector Strategic and Investment Plan specifically sets out targets and strategies that work towards equitable access by people in the PRDP districts to health services.<sup>65</sup> However, the northern regions still have the poorest access to health services in the country,<sup>66</sup> and perform badly on national indicators. Child mortality rates in the north (10.6%), for example, remain significantly above the national average (7.6%).<sup>67</sup>

### 3.2 Community participation in local government planning activities

The second most frequently occurring argument to arise in the qualitative findings, in response to community dissatisfaction, was lack of community knowledge with regard to budget and guideline restrictions. This was attributed to insufficient sensitisation of and/or engagement with planning, monitoring and evaluation processes for service delivery. The following section will discuss findings pointing towards the extent, and quality, of community engagement in local government planning activities. It will also explore broader issues relating to governance and accountability deficits in the management of the PRDP projects that arose from the panel discussions.

As shown in Table 10, in both years, the majority of respondents in all six districts had not participated in local government planning activities. Across years and districts, participation levels averaged at 16.7%. The results show that Gulu had the highest levels in 2011, with 18.7% of respondents reporting that they had participated in planning meetings. However, it also presented the sharpest decrease in participation, dropping to 14.6% in 2012. It, therefore, also presented the lowest proportion of respondents who had participated in local government planning activities in 2012. Kitgum also demonstrated a fall in participation, from 17.7% in 2011 to 15.9% in 2012. Participation levels in the remaining four districts all increased by an average of 1.5%.

61 Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (August 2012).

62 Consensus panel, sub-county level, Lira-Lango (June 2012).

63 K. Gelsdorf et al (2012). *Livelihoods, basic services and social protection in northern Uganda and Karamoja*. Working Paper 4. London: Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, Overseas Development Institute. p.20.

64 Ministry of Health (2012). *Annual health sector performance report: Financial year 2011/12*. Kampala. p.54.

65 Ministry of Health (2010). *Health Sector Strategic and Investment Plan: Promoting people’s health to enhance socio-economic development 2010/11–2014/15*. Kampala.


66 K. Gelsdorf et al (2012). Op. cit. p.21.

67 Ministry of Health (2010). Op. cit. p.63.

**Table 10: Participation in local government planning by district**

District	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Amuru	115	15.7	72	17.9	187	16.5
Gulu	137	18.7	59	14.6	196	17.3
Kitgum	130	17.7	64	15.9	194	17.1
Lamwo	115	15.7	69	17.1	184	16.2
Lira	118	16.1	70	17.4	188	16.5
Otuke	118	16.1	69	17.1	187	16.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>733</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>403</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,136</b>	<b>100</b>

Gender disaggregation showed that more men than women had participated in local government planning activities (see Figure 7). In Acholi, female respondents constituted only 38.1% of those who had participated in local government planning compared with 61.9% male respondents, and 38.3% compared with 61.7% in 2012. In Lango, female participation was slightly higher, at 40.4% in 2011 and 41.7% in 2012.

**Figure 7: Participation in local government planning by sub-region and gender**

Qualitative findings presented perceptions of a “gap” between policy and practice with regard to participatory planning. There was widespread recognition of the existence of participatory planning structures for incorporating community priorities from parish up to district level. However, panellists frequently asserted that implementation is often frustrated by prevailing challenges, including budget restrictions and inadequate engagement with the process at lower levels. For instance, in Acholi, panel respondents raised concerns that some groups can be marginalised from the planning process as a result of poor mobilisation – leading to low turnout levels. A general lack of awareness among communities regarding their role in the planning processes was also highlighted: *‘despite the fact that the way it is handled is not very good because people are not always sensitised, they don’t know about their roles.’*<sup>68</sup> However, high attendance was not thought to necessarily correspond with quality participation. This was seen particularly in the case of gender disparities: *‘...women do not participate as broadly as men in planning meetings even if they attend ... they are afraid to talk.’*<sup>69</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (August 2012).

<sup>69</sup> Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

In the Acholi and Lango validation meetings, local government participants felt that low results for community participation in planning activities reflected the reality in their localities. One local government representative responded by asking, *'if we're not responding to the communities' priorities then whose priorities are we representing?'*<sup>70</sup> Recommendations to emerge from the validation included that government should allocate more money to local government service delivery planning activities, and that the National Planning Authority should be decentralised.

### 3.3 Governance and accountability challenges

The qualitative findings commonly raised governance and accountability challenges affecting local government service delivery. These were felt particularly in the context of accessing resources, where corruption and bureaucratic delays in the disbursement of funds were thought to be impinging on project implementation. There was a common claim that communities and local governments are not properly informed about the PRDP activities. As a result, they are not able to monitor projects, and lack channels through which they can remedy cases of substandard construction and corruption, particularly in the award of contracts. Especially at sub-county level, this manifested itself in feelings of resentment based on a perception that the central government does not have faith in their ability to implement and monitor programmes locally. Panellists argued that development activities are too often controlled from the centre or by external providers brought in. Anger at the misappropriation of the PRDP funds by central government was also presented. Particularly strong sentiments at sub-county level included the perception that the PRDP has been designed purely to attract donor funds for embezzlement by central government.

*'Why don't they bring us the money and trust us to monitor and implement what the community suggests ... but now they come up with good plans which the prime minister controls from afar ... these people building come and do sub-standard work and there is theft of resources ... I was chairman of the health centre and the buildings were incomplete and when I followed up I found that the money had been diverted ... or should I call it embezzled on the way ... as a result the health centre never got all the buildings ... this government is full of lies ... they use our problems ... to attract funds [from development partners] they need and divert to other things ... my request is let this programme be implemented at the sub-county or we be informed and given the mandate formally so we have authority to go and monitor the work and make sure it is done properly ... this would make the builders respect the people from the sub-county. It is better than monitoring from a distance by the other organs ... We are on remote control ...'*<sup>71</sup>

A lack of trust among the communities towards their local leaders was frequently raised. Perceptions of mistrust and marginalisation were highlighted among specific groups such as the youth. Community allegations of local government corruption were reported in the context of feedback platforms such as *Barazas*. In this context, local government respondents highlighted the importance of empowering local cultural and political leaders to become more representative of, and closer to, communities.

*'... there is this thing that we held last year called the Baraza; the community was not contented with our service, because the way they were firing us; they are very negative about the way the world is today, even if you are doing something in a transparent manner, they still think you are corrupt. Their questions were really targeting corruption, because we made available information on the money coming into the district, millions and millions. Now they started shouting, they really started shouting.'*<sup>72</sup>

70 Acholi and Lango validation meeting, Gulu (January 2013).

71 Consensus panel, Amach sub-county, Lira-Lango (June 2012).

72 Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).



In the research validation meeting, participants responded to these issues by raising concerns relating to the accountability of local councillors, and the urgent need to hold fresh local council/councillor (LC) elections in order to legitimise their positions and clarify their legal status. In the context of ongoing revelations of large-scale corruption involving the PRDP funds in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), local government validation panellists stressed the need to consider channelling funds directly to local councils.

## 4. Conflict-resolution mechanisms for addressing community-level security

The importance of effective dispute-resolution mechanisms in Acholi and Lango sub-regions goes beyond responding to immediate issues, such as land conflict and SGBV, to broader processes of peacebuilding and reconciliation. Studies have noted a “tension” that exists between traditional and state processes for community-level conflict resolution in Uganda. Perhaps nowhere is this more visible than the northern region, where community-based traditional approaches to conflict resolution are widespread. Cultural institutions have played an instrumental role in post-conflict peacebuilding, and they constitute significant resources for reconciliation processes in the region. However, aligning cultural with formal state mechanisms has proved challenging, especially in terms of reconciling restorative with retributive approaches. The PRDP II, under Strategic Objective 4, provides for ‘enhancing the roles of community-level mechanisms, taking into account how traditional and formal mechanisms interact’.<sup>73</sup> However, it does not describe in detail how these mechanisms will be enhanced. Particularly in the context of land and SGBV cases, which are often strongly influenced by cultural customs and practices, identifying how traditional and formal systems work together is central to the peacebuilding and recovery process in northern Uganda.

This indicator maps the effectiveness of conflict-resolution mechanisms in addressing community-level security. These include formal statutory structures such as the police and courts, but also informal customary mechanisms applied, for example, by local and cultural leaders. Results assess how communities use these structures, as well as the availability and accessibility of conflict-resolution institutions and their functionality (distance, institutions and costs) in addressing conflicts and disputes. In doing so, they address how and the extent to which both statutory and customary institutions play a role in ensuring peace and security at community level.

### 4.1 Community use of conflict-resolution mechanisms

The large majority of respondents who had been involved in a conflict within the two years preceding the survey reported their case through either an official or informal mechanism (86.3% in 2011 and 85.7% in 2012) (see Table 11). A lesser majority reported that their case had been resolved, decreasing from 65% in 2011 to 61.5% in 2012. Therefore, 35% of the cases in 2011 and 38.5% in 2012 were ongoing.

**Table 11: Conflicts reporting and status of their case**

Status	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Reporting of conflicts</b>						
Reported	359	86.3	390	85.7	749	86.0
Did not report	57	13.7	65	14.3	122	14.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>416</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>455</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>871</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Status of conflict resolution</b>						
Resolved	279	65.0	280	61.5	559	63.2
Ongoing	150	35.0	175	38.5	325	36.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>429</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>455</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>884</b>	<b>100</b>

<sup>73</sup> Government of Uganda (2012). PRDP II, p.35.

As shown in Table 12, the most common mechanism being used to resolve cases was the LC system, in both years. However, it was more popular in 2011 (47.7%) than in 2012 (40.7%). The clan system was the second most commonly used mechanism, increasing in popularity from 24.9% in 2011 to 31.2% in 2012.

**Table 12: Mechanisms being used to resolve cases**

Type of mechanism	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
LC system	265	47.7	239	40.7	504	44.1
Clan system	138	24.9	183	31.2	321	28.1
Police and courts	115	20.7	133	22.7	248	21.7
Mediation options	22	4.0	31	5.3	53	4.6
Area land committee	13	2.3	0	0.0	13	1.1
District land board	2	0.4	0	0.0	2	0.2
Mob justice	0	0.0	1	0.2	1	0.1
Community paralegal	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>555</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>587</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,142</b>	<b>100</b>

In the qualitative findings, a certain level of integration was noted between the LC courts and traditional structures, with one panellist commenting: *‘LCs usually use the cultural method of resolving these problems.’*<sup>74</sup> Such statements indicate that, rather than distinct approaches, the two most popular mechanisms used by communities employ common methods in certain contexts. It could also mean that the use of cultural methods by LCs contributes towards their popularity as the primary conflict-resolution mechanism used by communities. The relationship between these two structures will be explored in the following sections.

## 4.2 Traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms

Across sub-regions, qualitative findings presented perceptions of the effectiveness of traditional justice mechanisms for addressing conflict. Panellists raised the comparative advantage of community-based resolutions due to the ability of local arbitrators to monitor decisions closely and ensure they are adhered to. Adversely, there was a sense that more remote official channels are not able to eradicate the potential for future conflict, *‘because even if you put that person in prison, after serving his sentence, he will still have to come back to the community’*.<sup>75</sup> Moreover, respondents considered decisions made within the communities to hold greater legitimacy, adding to their sustainability.

Therefore, although the importance and centrality of the official judicial system was recognised, panellists consistently argued for the need to empower local leaders and traditional structures. It was felt that, rather than work in isolation from one another, efforts should be made by the government to integrate traditional justice mechanisms into the official system.

*‘... the challenge is that the justice system does not recognise these traditional systems, and yet the traditional justice mechanism would be the best.’*<sup>76</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Consensus panel, sub-county level, Lira-Lango (June 2012).

<sup>75</sup> Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

<sup>76</sup> Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

### 4.3 Traditional methods and SGBV

The application of cultural methods was particularly prevalent in cases of SGBV in the qualitative narratives. There was a sense that such cases should be handled “within the family”, and that applying retributive legal mechanisms exacerbates the conflict. As a result, restorative systems of conflict resolution were often preferred, at least as the first step before turning to the authorities. The two most common mechanisms used in this context were: mediation by local councillors and cultural leaders, whose methods were in some cases perceived as synonymous; and, secondly, direct negotiation between the parties involved, whereby compensation terms are agreed. Respondents reasoned that ‘... cases of domestic violence are handled well here’ because the accused is ‘not arrested but summoned for a roundtable discussion. If both parties are not convinced then we summon their parents so that we harmonise both parties. They are taken home after reaching a common consensus.’<sup>77</sup> In this context, respondents lamented that the introduction of campaigns advocating women’s rights had resulted in an increase of people reporting SGBV cases through official channels, which is “causing problems”.

*‘... there are also elders in the community who assist families who are unable to settle conflicts, that is the first step before going to the authorities, but people are jumping straight to the authorities.’<sup>78</sup>*

However, panel respondents did not always view such informal mediation and negotiation measures positively. In fact, they were at times associated with a clear denial of justice for the victim. Of particular concern to such respondents was the prevalence of out-of-court settlements in cases of rape and child abuse. Rather than a legitimate alternative, the sense that such settlements “interfere” with the proper course of justice was presented.

*‘Negotiation is common even on issues of defilement. They say we discuss and find out that these two are relatives so let’s work on the issue traditionally. This leaves the police officers with nothing to do.’<sup>79</sup>*

The simultaneous application of informal and formal mechanisms arose in this context. In what could be termed the informal “commercialisation” of SGBV dispute resolution, panellists reported that parents are using the threat of formal prosecution to add weight to negotiation of informal compensation packages. At the same time as reporting a perpetrator to the police, or threatening to do so, they engage in informal dialogue to negotiate terms of a release based on compensation.

*‘... incidences that happen in villages like rape. They always want to have dialogue between them. Sometimes they report to the police when the negotiations are going on. For example, a suspect of defilement was reported to and after arresting him, the parents of the victim and the perpetrator were also meeting back home to negotiate his release, but we have the child protection unit that facilitated the transfer of the suspect to CPS, to our dismay, those parents went to CPS and released the suspect.’<sup>80</sup>*

As well as its significance for the management of SGBV, this example is indicative of a wider context presented across the qualitative findings, in which two parallel conflict-resolution structures are being used by communities simultaneously: the statutory and the customary. However, rather than operating in harmony, through integrated approaches, communities appear to be using the two structures against each other. Similar examples arose in the context of land disputes, where unfavourable court decisions are ignored and cultural leaders turned to in pursuit of alternative rulings. As a result, both informal and formal justice systems lose influence and legitimacy, and become subverted for personal gain. In this case, it also implies that legislation introduced to protect individuals from SGBV is actually indirectly making them more vulnerable to it. The inter-relationship between customary and formal approaches to conflict resolution will be discussed in further detail below, in the context of land disputes.

77 Consensus panel, sub-county level, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).

78 Consensus panel, district level, Otuoke-Lango (June 2012).

79 Consensus panel, Awach sub-county, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).

80 KI, Lokung sub-county, Lamwo-Acholi (June 2012).

## 4.4 Multiple channels and land conflict

Across years and regions, the use of only one conflict-resolution mechanism was the most commonly occurring approach. Tracking percentage change, the degree to which people used only one mechanism increased from 58.9% in 2011 to 61.7% in 2012. The use of two mechanisms decreased from 34.6% in 2011 to 26.5% in 2012. However, the use of three mechanisms increased from 6.1% in 2011 to 11.7% in 2012.

Despite an overall decrease in the use of multiple mechanisms in solving conflicts, it is notable that over a third of the approaches used were made up of more than one mechanism across the years, with 30.4% applying two, 9.1% applying three and 0.1% using four mechanisms.

The most popular combinations of mechanisms were the LC system and police or courts, making up 15.1% in 2011 and 12.2% in 2012 of mechanisms being used. The LC system coupled with the clan system comprised 14.8% of mechanisms used in 2011 and 11% in 2012. For those using three mechanisms, the most common combination was the LC system, clan system and police or courts (3.6% in 2011 and 9.2% in 2012).

In the qualitative findings, the use of multiple resolution mechanisms was most apparent in the context of land disputes. As an *'issue affecting the clan'*, traditional channels were considered effective resolution mechanisms for dealing with land conflicts.<sup>81</sup> Panellists argued that traditional leaders are *'well versed with land issues'* and their role in arbitrating disputes should be more widely recognised.<sup>82</sup> Indeed, recent analysis on conflict resolution in Acholi has highlighted the efficacy and efficiency with which community-level mechanisms can resolve land disputes.<sup>83</sup> In post-conflict regions in the north, where land conflicts make up roughly 94% of cases before local courts, such findings are particularly important.<sup>84</sup> Traditional leaders in regions such as Acholi have been found to have the trust of communities and be in a strong position to mediate between parties, as well as provide evidence that can be used in formal/statutory contexts. The value of integrated responses between formal and customary mechanisms has, therefore, been recognised in this context.

Qualitative findings highlighted the interplay between official and traditional mechanisms for resolving land disputes. However, the degree to which they were applied through integrated and complementary approaches was limited. Despite recognition that communities are inclined to seek official justice – *'people do not want negotiations and dialogue, they prefer the rule of law'*<sup>85</sup> – the narratives also reported that *'people continue to use the land even if the local court ruled against them, instead of an appeal in another court'*.<sup>86</sup> It was also reported that communities often turn to cultural resolution systems in the event that their cases are not successful in the courts.

Indeed, other studies have noted a “tension” that exists across the country between traditional and statutory mechanisms for conflict resolution at the community level. However, it has been argued that *'these structures need not be viewed as contradictory, but instead should be harnessed in a complementary fashion to support reconciliation and conflict resolution'*.<sup>87</sup> If mechanisms, either traditional or official, are not able to effectively manage conflicts, then part of the problem, according to these testimonies, is in stakeholder compliance with decisions made: whether the rulings hold enough legitimacy in the eyes of the people to be adhered to. Increased empowerment and integration of traditional channels could contribute to more impactful and sustainable conflict

81 Consensus panel, district level, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).

82 Consensus panel, Amuru sub-county, Amuru-Acholi (June 2012).

83 C. Burke and E. Egaru Omiat (2011). *Identification of good practices in land conflict resolution in Acholi*. Kampala: United Nations Uganda.

84 A. Knutzen and A. Smith (2012). Op. cit. p.7.

85 KI, Lakang sub-county, Lamwo-Acholi (June 2012).

86 Consensus panel, Awach sub-county, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).

87 A. Knutzen and A. Smith (2012). Op. cit. p.7.

resolution. One way of doing so would be to formalise their relationship with local councils. This could involve assurances that traditional leaders cooperate with local councils by providing detailed documented evidence, especially in the context of land disputes.

## 4.5 Reasons for conflict-resolution failure

Analysing responses that appeared in both years, the most frequently mentioned reason advanced by respondents who had not been able to resolve their conflict was the lack of a witness (25.7% in 2011 and 10.8% in 2012) (see Table 13). This was followed by failure of the respondent to show up (19.3% in 2011 and 11.7% in 2012), and lack of money to meet pertinent costs (24.3% in 2011 and 7.2% in 2012). In 2012 slow court process (46.8%) was the most commonly advanced reason for failing to resolve conflicts.

**Table 13: Reasons for failing to resolve conflicts**

Reason	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Slow court process	0	0.0	104	46.8	104	28.7
Lack of witness	36	25.7	24	10.8	60	16.6
Failure of respondent to show up	27	19.3	26	11.7	53	14.6
Lack of money	34	24.3	16	7.2	50	13.8
Perpetrator paid money to influence decision	0	0.0	21	9.5	21	5.8
Refused to respect court or mediation decision	0	0.0	20	9.0	20	5.5
Lack of time	19	13.6	0	0.0	19	5.2
Lack of quorum	12	8.6	0	0.0	12	3.3
Lack of male representative to clan court	10	7.1	0	0.0	10	2.8
Perpetrator LC or relative of LC or person in authority	0	0.0	6	2.7	6	1.7
Distance to resolution centre	2	1.4	4	1.8	6	1.7
Decided to ignore	0	0.0	1	0.5	1	0.3
Perpetrator mentally unstable	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>362</b>	<b>100</b>

In the 2012 qualitative findings, there was a sense of improvement in conflict-resolution mechanisms, particularly as a result of government efforts under the PRDP to strengthen community-level security. Respondents noted an improvement in security infrastructure, for example, by increasing the number of police posts, and building courts and prisons.

*'[PRDP] is playing a big role, because in the past these policemen did not have communication gadgets, they were not having transport, access routes.'*<sup>88</sup>

*‘... the judiciary and the police have worked hard to reduce the levels of crime ... so it’s good progress and also we have already established a court in Amuru district that serves both Amuru and Nwoya which has helped dispose of the backlog that was in court in relation to the crimes ...’*<sup>89</sup>

However, this perceived improvement was compromised in the face of prevailing resource limitations, which were felt to be resulting in corruption, particularly in the form of bribes. The request for facilitation fees by police when called upon to respond to crimes was recurring. As a result, services were considered to be largely unreliable. As one panellist asserted, *‘these policemen are also compromised so it is always by luck according to the person you will get’*.<sup>90</sup> Panellists often directed frustration towards inadequate central government budget allocations in this context.

*‘... like look at the police they lack enough resources so they were left to the community to feed them. The police really suffer with their job ... It angers me because these areas have been ignored.’*<sup>91</sup>

*‘... the police force like he said faces low manpower, secondly they are ill equipped ... So sometimes we push this burden to the victims like when we tell them if you can hire me a boda-boda, or carry me on your bicycle so I can come resolve the issue.’*<sup>92</sup>

Corruption was also identified as a primary barrier to effective conflict resolution in the LC courts. Such sentiments were particularly strong in Otuke district, Lango, where it was felt that bribes were a pre-condition to accessing justice, as well as drivers of biased and ineffective courts.

*‘... the LC system, the LC court is not impartial, is not a transparent court and the cause of that is poverty; because if I have got a complaint against you, I can give something to the LC, then the court will be biased, they are not impartial and this is why most of the cases will not get solved from the LC court, you will see it leaves to go to the sub-county, and then eventually a grade 2 magistrate, then a G1 takes it up. I see a lot of weaknesses in the LC court.’*<sup>93</sup>

In line with community-level survey results showing “lack of money” to be a primary reason for cases not being resolved, the perception that *‘[f]air justice is very costly’* arose in the panel discussions. The disproportionate impact corrupt behaviour has on poorer community members was frequently argued in this context.

*‘The reason why people cannot access justice is poverty. Fair justice is very costly. Here as much as the PRDP is doing much, someone said there is no livelihood so if you go to the LC2 court, the cost of the case is 50,000shs and not everyone can afford it.’*<sup>94</sup>

## 4.6 Capacity and knowledge gaps among users and providers

Low capacity levels were also commonly considered to impede effective conflict resolution. Particularly among the police: *‘the capacity was not there, and they needed a lot of training ... they don’t know exactly their roles and their functions’*.<sup>95</sup> But the courts, most notably at lower levels, were also thought to be in need of further capacity building: *‘sub-county courts are there but they need a lot of sensitisation, training and the rest of it’*.<sup>96</sup> Such capacity deficits were felt to be resulting in courts handling cases beyond their jurisdiction.

89 Consensus panel, district level, Amuru-Acholi (June 2012).

90 Consensus panel, district level, Lira-Lango (June 2012).

91 Consensus panel, Amach sub-county, Lira-Lango (June 2012).

92 Consensus panel, Adwari sub-county, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

93 Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

94 Consensus panel, Awach sub-county, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).

95 Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (June 2012).

96 Consensus panel, district level, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).

*'... on the LC system, maybe LC1, you will find that because they do not have that knowledge they will be dealing with cases that they are not meant to handle, as in the case of defilement, so I think the capacity of these LC courts needs to be built so that they are referring cases they are not supposed to handle and dealing properly with those they are ...'*<sup>97</sup>

Particularly in the case of threats from South Sudan, the lack of technical capacity among local and cultural conflict-resolution mechanisms to manage conflicts was felt strongly by the sub-county respondents:

*'... like the chiefs we use them to solve problems but people undermine them. These chiefs should be taken for some law courses. Chiefs are not qualified by law. Police are too corrupt because of the little money they earn and the LCs are also poor, they also need to be educated on legal matters.'*<sup>98</sup>

In addition to the providers, capacity and knowledge gaps among victims and other users of conflict-resolution mechanisms were also identified. Such knowledge gaps were thought to impact the quality of services that both victims and the accused receive, particularly in terms of an awareness of the rights and mechanisms available to them. Even if the proper judicial infrastructure is in place, if communities are not fully sensitised to their roles and entitlements in prosecution and judicial processes, then such infrastructure becomes redundant. As a result, there was a recurring sense that the government is not doing enough to engage communities in conflict-resolution structures and procedures through targeted training and sensitisation.

*'And another big problem is the ignorance of the community: how do you report? And which mechanism do you use? If a girl is defiled in a village in Ogong, how should the parents report the case so that it reaches the police in Otuke? Maybe it gets to the state attorney; I am happy that the courts are being set up and the magistrate will be posted, but it has been a big challenge, the system of reporting, people are not aware of their rights when a problem arises: how do you report a case like defilement; how do you seek legal redress if you are detained in prison here? People are over-staying on remand, beyond the mandatory period. Do inmates know that after 60 days, on a simple case, they are entitled to mandatory bail? Of course, that would involve strengthening the office of the probation officer, where there's a desk for community service programmes as an alternative to imprisonment.'*<sup>99</sup>

Knowledge gaps on the part of victims were also considered to significantly impact perceptions of conflict-resolution mechanisms. In Lira, one respondent highlighted that communities often do not understand the basic principles of prosecution, for example, the need for evidence. When someone has been released on the basis that no conclusive evidence could be provided, people assume that a bribe has been involved. In this context, the apparent lack of faith in, and adherence to, official justice mechanisms among community members could also be a result of minimal comprehension of the law/official prosecution procedures, their restrictions and requirements (e.g. evidence, limited custody periods).

*'The victims don't always follow up on the cases, and according to the laws you cannot detain a suspect for two days without food. That is why we give police bonds. This means we are still monitoring the suspect and preparing their files. Police are always blamed but people don't follow up the files sent to the court. We must have in mind that police are helping.'*<sup>100</sup>

97 Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

98 Consensus panel, Amuru sub-county, Amuru-Acholi (June 2012).

99 Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

100 KI, Lakang sub-county, Lamwo-Acholi (June 2012).



According to one respondent, such a *'lack of knowledge on the law also leads to lack of justice, they feel they ... can handle things locally'*.<sup>101</sup> As discussed above, the narratives indicated that communities often seek to settle conflicts through informal negotiation and compensation methods, frequently with the assistance of traditional leaders. However, addressing conflicts "locally" was not always considered a valid substitute. In fact, it was commonly associated with increased levels of insecurity in the narratives:

*'So if a man hacks his wife or vice versa and no one goes for a follow up [often due to the distance needed to travel to do so] after two days the suspect is released and sent home. Out of court settlements also encourage violence ... When criminals are taken to police and return home the victim usually plans for revenge.'*<sup>102</sup>

As outlined earlier, in both years, the large majority of respondents who had been involved in a conflict within the two years preceding the survey reported their case through either an official or informal mechanism (86.3% in 2011 and 85.7% in 2012). The most common mechanism being used to resolve the cases was the LC system, in both years. However, it was more popular in 2011 (47.7%) than in 2012 (40.7%). The clan system was the second most commonly used mechanism, increasing in popularity from 24.9% in 2011 to 31.2% in 2012.

In the qualitative findings, a certain level of integration was noted between the LC courts and traditional structures, with one panellist commenting, *'LCs usually use the cultural method of resolving these problems'*.<sup>103</sup> Such statements indicated that, rather than distinct approaches, the two most popular mechanisms used by communities employ common methods in certain contexts.

---

101 Consensus panel, Orom sub-county, Kitgum-Acholi (May 2012).

102 Consensus panel, Orom sub-county, Kitgum-Acholi (May 2012).

103 Consensus panel, sub-county level, Lira-Lango (June 2012).

## 5. Access to economic opportunities

The relationship between poverty and conflict has been addressed within a significant body of literature in recent decades. Perhaps the most influential in this regard has been Paul Collier's research. Collier shows strong correlation between the world's poorest nations and the existence of conflict. Of particular significance to the PRDP peacebuilding and recovery aims, he argues that there is a 44% chance of slipping back into violence if economic growth does not take place during the post-conflict period.<sup>104</sup> Indeed, as one Lango district panellist in this research asserted, '[w]e assume war is insecurity but poverty also brings insecurity.'<sup>105</sup>

Despite numerous targeted interventions, poverty levels in the Greater North have remained significantly above the national average. In 1992, 74% of people in northern Uganda were living below the poverty line, compared with 56% nationally. In 2009/10, the first year of implementation of the PRDP, the poverty rate had fallen to 46%, compared with the national average of 25%. Although poverty in the north has declined since the end of the LRA insurgency, inequality between the north and other regions has increased significantly since 1992. Due to the more rapid rate of poverty reduction in other areas of the country, the north is now four times poorer than the Central region, more than twice as poor as the Western region, and almost as poor as the Eastern region. In addition, due to population growth, the number of poor people living in the north has risen in absolute terms, while in all other regions it has fallen. In 2009/10, the number of poor people living in northern Uganda stood at 2.84 million, compared with 2.6 million in 1992.<sup>106</sup>

In total, 56% of the population currently living in poverty in Uganda (4.2 million) lives in the geographical catchment area of the PRDP.<sup>107</sup> Lasting peace is unlikely to be achieved in post-conflict regions such as Acholi and Lango without tackling poverty. Youth unemployment, for example, has been identified as a key driver of insecurity in Uganda.<sup>108</sup> In regions such as Acholi and Lango, large-scale displacement has resulted in substantial populations of youths who have grown up in camps and returned, mostly uneducated, to areas with few employment opportunities. Similarly, studies have shown that the socio-economic status of the community greatly influences the risk of SGBV.<sup>109</sup> Due to its impact on family welfare and gender relations in particular, poverty has been cited by many studies in Uganda as one of the major causes of violence. Socio-economic factors have been attributed to the existence of SGBV in the home in various proportions: poverty and literacy (35%); poverty and alcoholism (22%); poverty and substance abuse (40%).<sup>110</sup>

Findings under this indicator present levels of access to economic opportunities among community members in order to measure whether they perceive themselves as being part of the regional or national trend of economic advancement. Results are concerned with the assurance of basic sustenance through livelihood initiatives and whether long-term patterns of social exclusion in the economic sphere are being addressed as a result of the PRDP/PCDP interventions, as mechanisms for stimulating broad economic growth. Changes in private investment opportunities that determine inflow of private capital and resources into the various PRDP sub-regions, and whether

104 P. Collier (2007). *The Bottom Billion: why the poorest countries are failing and what we can do about it*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

105 Consensus panel, Amuru sub-county, Amuru-Acholi (June 2012).

106 Government of Uganda (2010). *National Development Plan*. Kampala.

107 Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2003). *Post-conflict reconstruction: The case of northern Uganda – Discussion Paper 7 (Draft)*. Kampala: Government of Uganda.

108 A. Knutzen and A. Smith (2012). *Op. cit.*

109 Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2006). *Uganda demographic and health survey*. Kampala: Government of Uganda.

110 M. Kerrissey (2008). *Gender-based violence in Uganda: A literature review for Health Communication Partnership*. Kampala: Health Communication Partnership.

citizens actually think that they can and do access economic opportunities, are also central to the observations made under PCI 4.

## 5.1 Access to sufficient economic opportunities

In Acholi, there was an increase of 13.7 percentage points in the proportion of respondents perceiving themselves to have access to sufficient economic opportunities, from 31.5% in 2011 to 45.2% in 2012 (see Table 14). In Lango, there was a slightly larger 14.6 percentage point increase in such respondents, from 27% in 2011 to 41.6% in 2012. Across both regions, there was an overall increase of 14.2 percentage points, from 29.8% in 2011 to 44% in 2012. Thus, despite the increment, the perception of having access to sufficient economic opportunities remained a minority view in 2012.

By gender, the proportion of male respondents holding this perception was larger than that of female respondents in both years (30.1% male compared with 29.6% female in 2011, and 46.6% male compared with 41.5% female in 2012). By age, those in the 18–34 group had the largest proportion of respondents who perceived themselves to have access to sufficient economic opportunities in 2011. This increased to 45% in 2012. However, in 2012 those in the 35–54 bracket (47.5%) had the largest proportion of respondents perceiving themselves to have access to sufficient economic opportunities.

**Table 14: Access to sufficient economic opportunities by gender and age**

	Acholi				Lango				Total			
	No.	%	RR	P-Value	No.	%	RR	P-Value	No.	%	RR	P-Value
<b>All</b>												
2011	204/648	31.5	1.00		103/381	27.0	1.00		307/1029	29.8	1.00	
2012	344/761	45.2	1.44 (1.25- 1.64)	<0.001	156/375	41.6	1.54 (1.25- 1.89)	<0.001	500/1136	44.0	1.48 (1.32- 1.65)	<0.001
<b>Male</b>												
2011	104/324	32.1	1.00		49/184	26.6	1.00		153/508	30.1	1.00	
2012	182/378	48.1	1.50 (1.24- 1.81)	<0.001	79/182	43.4	1.63 (1.22- 2.18)	0.001	261/560	46.6	1.55 (1.32- 1.81)	<0.001
<b>Female</b>												
2011	100/324	30.9	1.00		54/197	27.4	1.00		154/521	29.6	1.00	
2012	162/383	42.3	1.37 (1.12- 1.67)	0.002	77/193	39.9	1.46 (1.09- 1.94)	0.010	239/576	41.5	1.40 (1.19- 1.65)	<0.001
<b>18–34</b>												
2011	132/414	31.9	1.00		68/225	30.2	1.00		200/639	31.3	1.00	
2012	200/430	46.5	1.46 (1.23- 1.73)	<0.001	79/190	41.6	1.38 (1.06- 1.78)	0.016	279/620	45.0	1.44 (1.24- 1.66)	<0.001
<b>35–54</b>												
2011	51/171	29.8	1.00		27/111	24.3	1.00		78/282	27.7	1.00	
2012	114/232	49.1	1.65 (1.26- 2.15)	<0.001	58/130	44.6	1.83 (1.25- 2.68)	0.002	172/362	47.5	1.72 (1.38- 2.14)	<0.001
<b>55+</b>												
2011	20/59	33.9	1.00		8/45	17.8	1.00		28/104	26.9	1.00	
2012	30/99	30.3	0.89 (0.56- 1.42)	0.637	19/55	34.5	1.94 (0.94- 4.02)	0.073	49/154	31.8	1.18 (0.80- 1.74)	0.404

Comparing results across years and sub-regions, failure to access credit (17.5%) was the most frequently mentioned reason why people could not take advantage of the economic opportunities in their community (see Table 15). This was followed by laziness (11.7%), lack of qualifications (11.2%), limited access to land (10.2%) and lack of vocational skills (9.5%). In 2011 lack of capital (29.9%) and in 2012 failure to access credit (27.1%) were the most frequently mentioned reasons.

**Table 15: Failure to take advantage of available economic opportunities**

Reason for failure	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Failure of access to credit	93	8.3	289	27.1	382	17.5
Lack of capital	334	29.9	0	0.0	334	15.3
Laziness	91	8.1	164	15.4	255	11.7
Lack of qualifications	118	10.6	126	11.8	244	11.2
Limited access to land	76	6.8	146	13.7	222	10.2
Lack of vocational skills	103	9.2	104	9.8	207	9.5
Lack of tools and equipment	135	12.1	0	0.0	135	6.2
Lack of economic ideas	109	9.7	0	0.0	109	5.0
Lack of information on available economic opportunities	0	0.0	89	8.3	89	4.1
Lack of markets for products	0	0.0	61	5.7	61	2.8
Poor health of people	0	0.0	61	5.7	61	2.8
Rampant land conflicts	56	5.0	0	0.0	56	2.6
Poor roads	0	0.0	21	2.0	21	1.0
Failure to provide security	0	0.0	5	0.5	5	0.2
Job for a particular gender	3	0.3	0	0.0	3	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,118</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,066</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,184</b>	<b>100</b>

## 5.2 Respondent incomes and income sufficiency

Across sub-regions, by far the most common form of income-generating activity was the farming of crops, making up 55.3% in 2011 and 44.9% in 2012 of the activities respondents were engaged in (see Table 16). This was followed by earning an income from business market stalls (11.2% in 2011 and 12.4% in 2012) and casual labour (10.6% in 2011 and 10.7% in 2012). Tracking percentage change, there was a noticeable increase in respondents engaged in the rearing of livestock from 2.5% in 2011 to 10% in 2012. Similarly, the percentage of respondents engaged in a vocational occupation nearly doubled between 2011 and 2012, from 4.8% to 8.5%.

**Table 16: Respondent sources of income**


Source of income	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Farming crops	793	55.3	855	44.9	1,648	49.4
Business market stalls	161	11.2	236	12.4	397	11.9
Casual labour	152	10.6	203	10.7	355	10.6
Vocational occupation	69	4.8	161	8.5	230	6.9
Farming livestock	36	2.5	190	10.0	226	6.8
Salaried worker	74	5.2	86	4.5	160	4.8
Business operation	73	5.1	70	3.7	143	4.3
Nothing	66	4.6	55	2.9	121	3.6
Remittances	0	0.0	34	1.8	34	1.0
Transport/ <i>Boda-boda</i>	11	0.8	13	0.7	24	0.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,435</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,903</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3,338</b>	<b>100</b>

In 2011 only 6.4% of respondents reported having sufficient income to sustain their households (see Table 17). In 2012 this increased to 13.3%. Despite the increment, these results are worrying, and point towards the inability of the regions' primary economic activity – farming of crops – to sustain households.

**Table 17: Respondents' income sufficiency**


Whether sufficient	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	61	6.4	151	13.3	212	10.1
No	898	93.6	984	86.7	1,882	89.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>959</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,135</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,094</b>	<b>100</b>

By sub-region, Lango presented lower proportions of respondents perceiving themselves to have sufficient income to sustain their household than Acholi in both years (see Figure 8). This rose from 3.9% in 2011 to 12.3% in 2012 for Lango. In Acholi, the percentage increased from 7.9% in 2011 to 13.8% in 2012.

**Figure 8: Respondents' income sufficiency by sub-region**

Male respondents made up considerably larger proportions of those reporting sufficient income to sustain their households in both years (see Figure 9). In 2011 the gender disparity was more pronounced, with 67.2% male compared with 32.8% female respondents making up those reporting sufficient income to sustain their households.

Figure 9: Respondents' income sufficiency by gender



### 5.3 Failure of agricultural sector development

In the qualitative findings, it was observed that rural communities are lagging behind towns and trading centres, despite recognition that there is great potential for increased economic opportunities through agriculture. In both sub-regions, there was a strong perception that more needs to be done to convert subsistence farming into a viable income-generating activity for rural communities. However, respondents felt that the move from subsistence to commercial farming was difficult due to existing methods of agricultural production and marketing.

*‘When you talk of Gulu booming, it’s a general term and one that will restrict us to the urban area such as Gulu town, but when you go to the rural areas you realise that there is a lot to be done.’<sup>111</sup>*

The need to add value to products through providing processing technology was commonly raised. High transaction costs caused by poor economic infrastructure were also frequently highlighted. For example, in Adwari sub-county, Otuke, the need for faster implementation of rural electrification schemes was felt strongly. Although some opportunities for selling farm produce were recognised – *‘if one grows beans there is a ready market in Sudan and Kitgum’*<sup>112</sup> – panellists in Lokung sub-county, Gulu, called for increased access to markets, encouraging the government to *‘go ahead and open a market because we believe the Sudanese will come to buy things, and we can generate local revenue’*.<sup>113</sup> Finally, despite the optimism around agriculture, respondents perceived growing apathy towards the drudgery of cultivation using hand implements, leading many youths to shun engaging in the sector: *‘with all this land there can be no excuse of unemployment; the youth just do not want to dig.’*<sup>114</sup>

In recent analysis from the World Bank, agriculture in northern Uganda has been described as ‘the region’s key comparative advantage’.<sup>115</sup> Moreover, it has found that Uganda’s overall reduction

111 Consensus panel, district level, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).

112 Consensus panel, Awach sub-county, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).

113 KI, Lokung sub-county, Lamwo-Acholi (June 2012).

114 Consensus panel, Adwari sub-county, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

115 World Bank (2012). *Promoting inclusive growth: Synthesis report*. Washington: The World Bank. p.xxi.

in rural poverty<sup>116</sup> has been driven by agriculture, alongside increased diversification of non-farm activities. According to the study, these activities taken together will remain ‘a key pillar for more inclusive growth’<sup>117</sup> in the country. Such findings correlate with perceptions presented in this study in terms of highlighting the importance of the agricultural sector for increasing economic opportunities in Acholi and Lango sub-regions. However, the results of this study also indicate that the majority of respondents engaged in farming crops do not generate enough income to sustain their households. Alongside poverty indicators showing the north to be lagging far behind the rest of the country, despite its “comparative advantage”, results indicate that the agricultural sector in northern Uganda is very far from being able to provide economic security. This has strong programmatic implications for the PRDP interventions under Strategic Objective 3 (revitalisation of the economy), some of which will be explored in the following sections.

## 5.4 Government responses to economic needs


As shown in Table 18, the percentage of respondents perceiving that the government was responding to the economic needs of the community increased from 58.9% in 2011 to 67.1% in 2012. This meant that 41.1% in 2011 and 32.9% in 2012 did not think that the government was responding to the economic needs of the community.

Table 18: Government responsiveness to economic needs

Whether government is responsive	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	593	58.9	762	67.1	1,355	63.2
No	414	41.1	374	32.9	788	36.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,007</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,136</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,143</b>	<b>100</b>

By sub-region, the percentage of respondents reporting that the government is responsive to the economic needs of the community increased from 54.2% in 2011 to 75.5% in 2012 in Lango (see Figure 10). In Acholi, levels remained roughly the same across years, with 61.6% in 2011 and 62.9% in 2012 of respondents holding this perception.

Figure 10: Government responsiveness to economic needs by sub-region



116 The rural poverty headcount in Uganda declined from 60.2% to 29.1% between 1992 and 2010. World Bank (2012). Op. cit.

117 Ibid. p.22.

Perceptions of government interventions to increase economic opportunities in the qualitative findings showed that grants, such as those under community-driven development programmes, were often considered *'too small'*.<sup>118</sup> As a result, communities are still lacking access to start-up capital and capacity development. With regard to agricultural support programmes, panellists identified a mismatch between farmers' needs and interventions. Allocations under programmes such as the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) and Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) were considered *'small'*, and the selection of beneficiaries was also challenged. For instance, with regard to NAADS, one respondent in Amach sub-county, Lira, lamented that its guidelines excluded youth recipients:

*'... its guidelines do not benefit anyone below the age of 18; that means child-headed families are left out; so its design doesn't help the whole community, especially the many youth.'*<sup>119</sup>

Others recognised its potential to improve livelihoods, but voiced similar reservations over its limited beneficiaries, which, according to one respondent in Awach sub-county, Acholi, *'have reduced from 200 members to 50 per parish'*.<sup>120</sup> Moreover, the NAADS selection process was felt to provoke competition and conflict in the community by benefiting only a limited number of people:

*'... what we often hear from the communities are complaints about NAADS. Money is sent from the central government to the local government, but what you will find is that the guidelines of NAADS do not properly represent the interests of the community. For instance, you will find that in a village, they will specify the number of beneficiaries, and this doesn't always suit the needs of the community, some will benefit and others will have to wait for another financial year – which will cause conflict.'*<sup>121</sup>

In Lamwo, women were considered to benefit less widely than men from programmes like the NAADS because they do not have access to the same mobilisation information as men. Meetings to select the NAADS beneficiaries were, therefore, reported to be attended mainly by men who have the habit of grouping together and nominating one another, excluding women. Even in cases where women are able to benefit, men will often assume control of whatever assets their wives have received, particularly in the case of separation.

*'... but even so, she can receive a goat or a cow or something like that, but even then, the men are the heads of the households. Because you will find that in the case of separation, if the goat was given by a development partner, an NGO, the husband will want it to remain with him when she goes.'*<sup>122</sup>

In line with reservations relating to government agricultural support programmes in these findings, the PRDP MTR found that support to farmers had not been adequately addressed during the Plan's first phase. According to the MTR, only a third of the sub-counties knew of interventions aimed at farmers and only half of these were considered to have successfully addressed their main problems. Those being implemented by NGOs as well as special programmes under the PRDP, such as the NUSAF, were the major interventions identified.

Other studies have emphasised concerns that government livelihood programmes are increasingly targeting "viable", as opposed to vulnerable, groups.<sup>123</sup> Those who already have the necessary assets and capacity to take advantage of such opportunities are, therefore, being favoured over a broader spectrum of the less able – and more vulnerable – community members. A lack of

118 Consensus panel, sub-county level, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).

119 Consensus panel, Amach sub-county, Lira-Lango (June 2012).

120 Consensus panel, Awach sub-county, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).

121 Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (May 2012).

122 KI, district level, Lamwo-Acholi (June 2012).

123 K. Gelsdorf et al (2012). Op. cit. p.32.



awareness underpinning these programmes of the effects caused by conflict-induced trauma has also been identified. As well as commonly noted “relief dependency” and “male idleness”, it has been argued that ‘the destitution borne out of repeated exposure to serious violations, asset loss, land grabbing, landlessness and even loss of family labour as a result of the war is contributing significantly to an inability to adapt and recover fully’.<sup>124</sup> A particularly vulnerable group in this context are the conflict-affected youth.

The PRDP I did not emphasise interventions under Strategic Objective 3 (revitalisation of the economy) for Acholi and Lango.<sup>125</sup> On the basis that the ongoing return of displaced persons in these regions made the context non-conducive to full-scale economic revitalisation, the first phase of the PRDP claimed to apply greater focus on ‘safe return, resettlement and re-integration’, as well as ‘strengthening power and road networks’.<sup>126</sup> Following the MTR’s finding that economic opportunities for youth had not been adequately addressed under the PRDP I, and that their unemployment constitutes a significant conflict driver, the PRDP II puts greater emphasis on directly affected post-conflict regions such as Acholi and Lango. Strategic Objective 3 (Priority Area 9) sets out interventions and objectives for improving vocational skills training for the uneducated youth who have grown up in camps, as well as those for improving access to finance and credit, especially for the youth, aimed at those wanting to set up small and medium-sized enterprises.

Indeed, a primary barrier to taking advantage of economic opportunities identified in this research was lack of credit. As post-conflict regions, communities in Acholi and Lango have not had the opportunity to accumulate assets needed to fulfil the criteria of many lending institutions, and credit is predominantly accessed through informal channels. How, and the extent to which, financial institutions are being used in these regions will be explored in the following section.

## 5.5 Financial institutions and their use

As shown in Table 19, the proportion of respondents using financial institutions to access credit decreased from 54.5% in 2011 to 37.7% in 2012. This was despite the fact that in 2012 the large majority of respondents (81.1% in Acholi and 79.7% in Lango) recognised the existence of financial institutions in their community, with village savings and loans associations (VSLAs) standing out as the most prominent.<sup>127</sup>

**Table 19: Access to credit**

Access to financial institution	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Not used	467	45.5	708	62.3	1,175	54.3
Used for credit	559	54.5	428	37.7	987	45.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,026</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,136</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,162</b>	<b>100</b>

As shown in Table 20, the large majority of respondents in both years reported having investment plans (99.5% in 2011 and 91.4% in 2012). Across the years, starting a business (25.4%) was the most popular investment plan, followed by investing in education (24.8%) and purchase of livestock (24.1%). Tracking the percentage change, there was an increase in plans to invest in education, from 21.4% in 2011 to 27.8% in 2012 of investment plans mentioned. There was also

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Defined as ‘North Central’ under the PRDP framework.

<sup>126</sup> Government of Uganda (2007). PRDP I. Kampala. p.77.

<sup>127</sup> Table not shown due to directly comparable question not being asked in 2011.

an increase in plans to start a business, from 24.5% in 2011 to 26.3% in 2012. The popularity of plans to purchase land reduced from 7.6% in 2011 to 4.6% in 2012.

The majority of respondents in both years planned to finance their personal investment schemes with their own income. This increased from 50.8% in 2011 to 57.8% in 2012. Across years, the second most popular option for financing investment plans was through support from an NGO, although this decreased from 20.6% in 2011 to 14.1% in 2012. The third most popular option was through borrowing from an institution, at 15% in 2011 and 11.2% in 2012.

**Table 20: Investment plans and source of finance for plans**

Plans and sources	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Investment plans</b>						
Have investment plans	1,027	99.5	1,038	91.4	2,065	95.2
No investment plan	5	0.5	98	8.6	103	4.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,032</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,136</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,168</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Type of investment plan</b>						
Start a business	505	24.5	629	26.3	1,134	25.4
Education	442	21.4	665	27.8	1,107	24.8
Purchase livestock	547	26.5	527	22.0	1,074	24.1
Construct a house	278	13.5	356	14.9	634	14.2
Purchase land	157	7.6	111	4.6	268	6.0
Build commercial building/rental house	134	6.5	0	0.0	134	3.0
Savings in bank	0	0.0	60	2.5	60	1.3
Buy a car	0	0.0	26	1.1	26	0.6
Buy <i>boda-boda</i>	0	0.0	19	0.8	19	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,063</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,393</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>4,456</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Source of finance for investment plan</b>						
Own income	818	50.8	971	57.8	1,789	54.4
Get NGO support	331	20.6	237	14.1	568	17.3
Borrow from an institution	242	15.0	188	11.2	430	13.1
Borrow from VSLA	122	7.6	189	11.3	311	9.5
Borrow from relatives	97	6.0	56	3.3	153	4.7
Pool resources from friends	0	0.0	39	2.3	39	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,610</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,680</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3,290</b>	<b>100</b>

In the qualitative findings, respondents highlighted the failure of some financial institutions to offer fully inclusive and accessible financial assistance. For example, in Kitgum district, Acholi, there was a sense that communities have not been properly sensitised on how to access and use savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs), as well as allegations of corruption and mismanagement among those who are responsible for running them.

*‘... the government came up with a plan to introduce SACCOs in various sub-counties, but I think this thing was misplaced, because they did not properly sensitise people about them and train the people who were supposed to manage them, so what you will find if you go to these sub-counties is that most of them are not functional. What’s more, the criteria that was used to select, what I will call the board members, was not made known to the people, and*

*the communities are not owning that SACCO, it is just being owned by a few people ... you'll find that the ones borrowing the money are also the ones working in it, I don't know whether they are borrowing the money or just taking it ... they just rotate it amongst themselves and the community are not getting access.*<sup>128</sup>

To summarise, in Acholi there was an increase of 13.7 percentage points in the proportion of respondents perceiving themselves to have access to sufficient economic opportunities, from 31.5% in 2011 to 45.2% in 2012. In Lango, there was a slightly larger 14.6 percentage point increase in such respondents, from 27% in 2011 to 41.6% in 2012. Across both regions, there was an overall increase of 14.2 percentage points, from 29.8% in 2011 to 44% in 2012.

Of equal concern, the large majority of respondents in both years perceived themselves as having insufficient income to sustain their households. In 2011 only 6.4% of respondents reported having enough income to sustain their households. In 2012 this increased to 13.3% (12.3% in Lango and 13.8% in Acholi).

---

128 Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi [June 2012].

## 6. Competition and grievances between regions

There are longstanding theories on the role grievances play in fuelling civil war,<sup>129</sup> most of which are based on the fundamental premise that conflict ‘cannot proceed without the presence of palpably perceived group differences, or grievances, which may have historical dimensions’.<sup>130</sup> In accordance with these theories, a ‘deep-rooted regional divide’<sup>131</sup> has been identified as one of the underlying causes of insurgency and rebellion in northern Uganda. Analysts have highlighted the role played by a complex history of colonial divide-and-rule policy, and the subsequent politicisation of ethnic and religious identities by post-independence regimes, in fermenting regional divides in the country. Such division has been reinforced by the current reality of unequal distribution of wealth and political authority across the country. Insurgency may have come to an end in northern Uganda, but ‘ongoing grievances linked to marginalisation and neglect by the State’ continue to threaten its peace.<sup>132</sup>

Studies have continually stressed the need for affirmative action in order to help northern Uganda move towards the national average of socio-economic indicators. Uganda’s progress towards achieving at least three of the seven Millennium Development Goals directly related to living standards at the national level has been acknowledged.<sup>133</sup> However, such advances do not apply across regions, with the north and northwest lagging behind on most indicators. As a recent World Bank report warned, ‘income welfare and living standards remain regionally unbalanced ... Regional disparities have to be expected in the development process, but they have to be managed to maintain a coherent social and political equilibrium.’<sup>134</sup> Indeed, in order to address these imbalances, the MTR of the PRDP found that ‘at least one or two more cycles of affirmative action programming and additional resource mobilisation’ will be required.<sup>135</sup> But it admitted the possibility of needing even more time to bring income poverty in the north into line with the rest of Uganda.

The PRDP was designed partly as an affirmative action plan to bridge the gap between the north and the rest of Uganda. Its stated commitment is to ‘improve socio-economic indicators to be in line with national ones in these areas affected by conflict and serious breakdown in law and order’.<sup>136</sup> With such aims in mind, the focus of findings under PCI 5 are changes in policies, political and public will, as well as those in regulation and practices that aid or support affirmative action development efforts for the PRDP regions like Acholi and Lango. The overall assumption is that a catch-up development programme such as the PRDP will promote national harmony by addressing regional imbalances using poverty indicators. Results primarily present: perceptions of how citizens assess their region compared with others; perceptions of government responses to regional imbalances; perceptions of optimism or pessimism that the differences between communities within and outside the sub-regions will be bridged; and explanatory factors or reasons for the various perceptions of development gaps.

129 For a comprehensive analysis of these theories, see: S.M. Murshed and M.Z. Tadjoeeddin (2007). *Reappraising the greed and grievance explanations for violent internal conflict*. MICROCON Research Working Paper 2. Brighton: MICROCON.

130 S.M. Murshed and M.Z. Tadjoeeddin (2007). *Op. cit.* p.4.

131 Z. Lomo and L. Hovil (2004). *Behind the violence: The war in northern Uganda*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. p.18.

132 ACCS (2012). *Op. cit.* p.9.

133 ‘Uganda has made progress in reducing the share of the population that suffers from hunger, in promoting gender equality, and in empowering women, while universal primary education (UPE) has already been met ... Uganda is on track to meet the targets for access to the human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) treatment and access to safe water.’ World Bank (2012). *Op. cit.* p.24.

134 *Ibid.* p.25.

135 Office of the Prime Minister (2011). *Op. cit.* p.iv.

136 Government of Uganda (2007). *Op. cit.* p.17.

Directly comparable indicator questions were not asked for PCI 5 in 2011 and 2012.<sup>137</sup> However, in both years, respondents presented a common sense of disadvantage in comparison to other regions in the country. Due to the divergence in questions asked, some 2011 and 2012 results are presented in separate tables.

## 6.1 Perceptions of living conditions in other regions

In 2011 there was a strong perception among respondents that they did not compare well with communities in other regions. The majority of respondents rated conditions elsewhere as “better” or “much better”. As shown in Table 21, ratings of “much better” were generally above 40%, reaching highs of 63.7% for level of business vibrancy, 57.5% for hospitals and 56.1% for schools. The only conditions receiving a majority rating of “not any better” were gardens (59%) and working in groups (42.5%).

Lamwo (64.5%), Lira (62.2%) and Otuke (60.9%) all had particularly high “much better” ratings for the quality of hospitals in other regions. Lamwo also presented notably strong perceptions that conditions in other regions are “much better” for level of business vibrancy (72.3%), general level of development (70.2%), schools (67%), housing (61.7%) and standard of living (60.6%). Lamwo, therefore, demonstrated the highest percentages of “much better” ratings across districts. Amuru district also had particularly strong perceptions of disadvantage when compared with other regions. It had notably high ratings of “much better” for level of business vibrancy (68.7%), schools (61.4%), general level of development (61%), standard of living (56.9%) and roads (55.2%). Gulu and Kitgum had generally lower percentages for the “much better” rating than other districts.

**Table 21: Perception of living conditions in other regions by district (2011)**

	Amuru		Gulu		Kitgum		Lamwo		Lira		Otuke		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Level of business vibrancy</b>														
Not any better	28	16.9	18	21.7	40	28.0	11	11.7	21	17.4	31	18.3	149	19.2
Better	24	14.5	22	26.5	19	13.3	15	16.0	21	17.4	32	18.9	133	17.1
Much better	114	68.7	43	51.8	84	58.7	68	72.3	79	65.3	106	62.7	494	63.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>776</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Hospitals</b>														
Not any better	29	17.5	14	17.3	36	25.2	10	10.8	14	11.8	23	13.6	126	16.3
Better	38	22.9	29	35.8	38	26.6	23	24.7	31	26.1	43	25.4	202	26.2
Much better	99	59.6	38	46.9	69	48.3	60	64.5	74	62.2	103	60.9	443	57.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>771</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>General level of development</b>														
Not any better	32	21.9	23	27.7	41	28.9	8	8.5	21	18.3	34	20.1	159	21.2
Better	25	17.1	17	20.5	34	23.9	20	21.3	34	29.6	33	19.5	163	21.8
Much better	89	61.0	43	51.8	67	47.2	66	70.2	60	52.2	102	60.4	427	57.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>749</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Schools</b>														
Not any better	30	18.1	17	21.0	30	21.0	9	9.6	13	10.7	29	17.2	128	16.5
Better	34	20.5	27	33.3	34	23.8	22	23.4	48	39.7	47	27.8	212	27.4
Much better	102	61.4	37	45.7	79	55.2	63	67.0	60	49.6	93	55.0	434	56.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>774</b>	<b>100</b>

137 See Annex: Methodology - Limitations of the study

Standard of living														
Not any better	32	20.0	20	24.1	43	30.1	9	9.6	26	23.2	33	19.5	163	21.4
Better	37	23.1	27	32.5	44	30.8	28	29.8	27	24.1	47	27.8	210	27.6
Much better	91	56.9	36	43.4	56	39.2	57	60.6	59	52.7	89	52.7	388	51.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>761</b>	<b>100</b>
Housing														
Not any better	30	18.2	22	26.8	39	27.5	12	12.8	24	20.0	42	25.0	169	21.9
Better	46	27.9	27	32.9	44	31.0	24	25.5	40	33.3	45	26.8	226	29.3
Much better	89	53.9	33	40.2	59	41.5	58	61.7	56	46.7	81	48.2	376	48.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>771</b>	<b>100</b>
Common mode of transport														
Not any better	32	19.3	23	27.7	41	28.7	14	14.9	21	17.4	36	21.3	167	21.5
Better	49	29.5	31	37.3	46	32.2	29	30.9	39	32.2	46	27.2	240	30.9
Much better	85	51.2	29	34.9	56	39.2	51	54.3	61	50.4	87	51.5	369	47.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>776</b>	<b>100</b>
Roads														
Not any better	32	19.4	17	20.5	35	24.5	15	16.0	17	14.0	36	21.3	152	19.6
Better	42	25.5	31	37.3	56	39.2	36	38.3	44	36.4	46	27.2	255	32.9
Much better	91	55.2	35	42.2	52	36.4	43	45.7	60	49.6	87	51.5	368	47.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>775</b>	<b>100</b>
Type of jobs														
Not any better	29	17.8	26	31.3	47	32.9	14	14.9	32	28.6	44	26.2	192	25.2
Better	55	33.7	32	38.6	49	34.3	32	34.0	26	23.2	46	27.4	240	31.5
Much better	79	48.5	25	30.1	47	32.9	48	51.1	54	48.2	78	46.4	331	43.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>763</b>	<b>100</b>
Sources of water														
Not any better	33	20.4	22	26.8	28	19.6	14	14.9	19	16.2	44	26.2	160	20.9
Better	59	36.4	31	37.8	74	51.7	37	39.4	34	29.1	48	28.6	283	36.9
Much better	70	43.2	29	35.4	41	28.7	43	45.7	64	54.7	76	45.2	323	42.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>766</b>	<b>100</b>
How people dress														
Not any better	36	21.8	23	27.7	35	24.5	13	13.8	21	17.4	40	23.7	168	21.7
Better	69	41.8	36	43.4	60	42.0	31	33.0	47	38.8	60	35.5	303	39.1
Much better	60	36.4	24	28.9	48	33.6	50	53.2	53	43.8	69	40.8	304	39.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>775</b>	<b>100</b>
Understanding of other languages														
Not any better	47	29.0	22	27.2	50	35.0	28	29.8	39	34.8	44	26.0	230	30.2
Better	74	45.7	38	46.9	59	41.3	35	37.2	52	46.4	82	48.5	340	44.7
Much better	41	25.3	21	25.9	34	23.8	31	33.0	21	18.8	43	25.4	191	25.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>761</b>	<b>100</b>

Working in groups														
Not any better	80	49.1	25	30.5	65	45.5	16	17.0	58	53.2	79	46.7	323	42.5
Better	49	30.1	30	36.6	46	32.2	37	39.4	29	26.6	56	33.1	247	32.5
Much better	34	20.9	27	32.9	32	22.4	41	43.6	22	20.2	34	20.1	190	25.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>760</b>	<b>100</b>
What gardens looked like														
Not any better	107	64.8	45	54.2	71	49.7	60	63.8	78	64.5	96	56.8	457	59.0
Better	35	21.2	23	27.7	53	37.1	22	23.4	26	21.5	52	30.8	211	27.2
Much better	23	13.9	15	18.1	19	13.3	12	12.8	17	14.0	21	12.4	107	13.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>775</b>	<b>100</b>

In correlation with 2011 results, in 2012 the majority (61.5%) of respondents across districts rated the level of development in their own region compared with others as worse (see Table 22). A small percentage (2.1%) rated it as better. Acholi districts of Gulu (69.9%), Kitgum (64.1%) and Lamwo (64.1%) had particularly high proportions of respondents perceiving their region to be worse off than others.

**Table 22: Level of development in own region compared with others (2012)**

Level of development	Amuru		Gulu		Kitgum		Lamwo		Lira		Otuke		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Worse	104	55.6	137	69.9	123	64.1	118	64.1	109	58.0	108	57.8	699	61.5
Same	11	5.9	9	4.6	3	1.6	6	3.3	16	8.5	6	3.2	51	4.5
Better	3	1.6	8	4.1	4	2.1	3	1.6	4	2.1	2	1.1	24	2.1
Don't know	69	36.9	42	21.4	62	32.3	57	31.0	59	31.4	71	38.0	360	31.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,134</b>	<b>100</b>

When asked why their region was worse off in comparison to others, as in 2011, better business vibrancy (23%) was the most frequently advanced reason in 2012 (see Table 23). This was followed by perceptions of better roads (17.7%) and better healthcare facilities (14.3%) in other regions.

By district, Lamwo (26%) and Kitgum (25.8%) had particularly strong perceptions of better business vibrancy in other regions. Kitgum (21.4%) and Lamwo (20.1%) also had notably high perceptions of better roads in other regions. These districts also presented the most frequently occurring perception of better health facilities elsewhere.

Table 23: Perception of why other regions are better off (2012)

Reason for perception	Amuru		Gulu		Kitgum		Lamwo		Lira		Otuke		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Vibrant business activities	85	20.8	103	19.8	93	25.8	93	26.0	90	23.7	88	23.3	552	23.0
Tarmac roads	63	15.4	89	17.1	77	21.4	72	20.1	60	15.8	65	17.2	426	17.7
Better healthcare facilities	47	11.5	60	11.5	64	17.8	69	19.3	43	11.3	60	15.9	343	14.3
Permanent housing	59	14.5	63	12.1	59	16.4	61	17.0	47	12.4	36	9.5	325	13.5
Many schools	42	10.3	56	10.7	61	16.9	63	17.6	51	13.4	43	11.4	316	13.1
Better-quality schools	48	11.8	65	12.5	1	0.3	0	0.0	33	8.7	38	10.1	185	7.7
Employment opportunities	36	8.8	46	8.8	3	0.8	0	0.0	38	10.0	30	7.9	153	6.4
Many healthcare facilities	22	5.4	33	6.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	8	2.1	10	2.6	73	3.0
Better agricultural-related activities	5	1.2	6	1.2	2	0.6	0	0.0	10	2.6	8	2.1	31	1.3
Not experienced conflicts	1	0.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>408</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>521</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>360</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>358</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>378</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,405</b>	<b>100</b>

In 2012 when asked to comment on why their region was worse off than others, the most frequently advanced reason was as a result of displacement/war (29.8%) (see Table 24). This was followed by perceptions of bad leadership at all levels (19.7%) and corruption at all levels (15.6%).

By district, Otuke (42.2%) and Lira (36%) had particularly strong perceptions that their region was at a disadvantage compared with others because of displacement/war. Kitgum (20.1%) presented the lowest percentage of this perception. Otuke (23.7%) had the strongest perception that bad leadership at all levels was the cause of their regional disadvantage, and Kitgum (22.5%) had the most frequently mentioned perception that corruption at all levels was to blame.

Table 24: Perception of why own region is worse off compared with others (2012)

Reason for perception	Amuru		Gulu		Kitgum		Lamwo		Lira		Otuke		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Displacement/war	85	29.9	110	29.6	58	20.1	71	24.7	87	36.0	98	42.2	509	29.8
Bad leadership at all levels	47	16.5	58	15.6	65	22.5	55	19.2	56	23.1	55	23.7	336	19.7
Corruption at all levels	41	14.4	67	18.0	65	22.5	52	18.1	29	12.0	12	5.2	266	15.6
Unfair resource allocation	27	9.5	46	12.4	44	15.2	51	17.8	30	12.4	22	9.5	220	12.9
Distance from capital city	22	7.7	16	4.3	26	9.0	32	11.1	21	8.7	26	11.2	143	8.4
High illiteracy rates	42	14.8	49	13.2	3	1.0	1	0.3	14	5.8	3	1.3	112	6.6
Failure to follow up government projects	17	6.0	16	4.3	15	5.2	14	4.9	1	0.4	11	4.7	74	4.3
Unfavourable rainfall patterns	3	1.1	10	2.7	13	4.5	11	3.8	4	1.7	5	2.2	46	2.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>287</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,706</b>	<b>100</b>



Similarly, in the qualitative findings, perceptions of lower levels of development were commonly illustrated through examples of poor service delivery, particularly in education and health. Weak infrastructure and the psycho-social effects of the war were also cited.

*‘... so when you go to the issue of services provided like hospitals, there are not well equipped hospitals in northern and when you get to the issue of schools like the only university here is Gulu University and the price is high for fees. I was admitted and paying defeated me.’<sup>138</sup>*

*‘I want to say the government should first see we lost people; we have no homes; and people need psycho-social help and the people should feel like the government cares about them. It will improve their mindsets and their lives will improve.’<sup>139</sup>*

## 6.2 Government efforts to address regional imbalances

Across sub-regions, tracking percentage change, there was an increase of 7.2 percentage points in the number of respondents perceiving that the government is addressing regional imbalances, from 57.7% in 2011 to 64.9% in 2012 (see Table 25).

**Table 25: Perception of whether government is addressing regional imbalances**

Whether government addresses imbalances	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	56	57.7	349	64.9	405	63.8
No	39	40.2	161	29.9	200	31.5
Don't know	2	2.1	28	5.2	30	4.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>538</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>635</b>	<b>100</b>

In both 2011 (58.9%) and 2012 (65.8%), larger percentages of respondents felt marginalised by government efforts to address imbalances (see Table 26). Between the years, the proportion of respondents perceiving that other regions receive more from the government than their own increased by 6.9 percentage points.

**Table 26: Perception of whether other regions receive more resources from government**


Whether other regions receive more resources from government	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	597	58.9	601	65.8	1,198	62.1
No	417	41.1	313	34.2	730	37.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,014</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>914</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,928</b>	<b>100</b>

In both years, Lango sub-region had a larger proportion of respondents perceiving that other regions receive more from the government than their own (see Figure 11). Tracking percentage change, both regions presented an increase in the proportion of respondents holding this perception, from 58.2% to 65.1% in Acholi and from 60% to 66.2% in Lango.

<sup>138</sup> Consensus panel, Amach sub-county, Lira-Lango (June 2012).

<sup>139</sup> Consensus panel, Adwari sub-county, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

Figure 11: Perception of government responsiveness to other regions by sub-region



Comparing results that appeared in both years, the majority of respondents felt that the government would address regional imbalances better through carrying out needs assessments before providing help, constituting 39.5% in 2011 and 20.7% in 2012 of proposals advanced (see Table 27). This was followed by community participation (31.5% in 2011 and 15.8% in 2012). In 2012 “equal resource allocation” (31.1%) appeared as the most frequently mentioned proposal for improving government efforts to address imbalances.

Table 27: Suggestions to address regional imbalances

Suggestion	2011		2012		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Carry out needs assessments/project monitoring	546	39.5	561	20.7	1,107	27.0
Through community participation	435	31.5	430	15.8	865	21.1
Equal resource allocation	0	0.0	843	31.1	843	20.6
Develop a criteria for selection of communities	402	29.1	0	0.0	402	9.8
Develop infrastructure	0	0.0	258	9.5	258	6.3
Local government participation in national planning	0	0.0	229	8.4	229	5.6
Change leadership at all levels	0	0.0	197	7.3	197	4.8
Compensate northern regions for war losses	0	0.0	116	4.3	116	2.8
Recruit technical staff at the district	0	0.0	80	2.9	80	2.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,383</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,714</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>4,097</b>	<b>100</b>

Taken together, these results indicate that the majority of respondents in both years perceived that conditions in other regions are better than their own, as well as that others receive more in government resources. Alongside these perceptions was an impression that communities are keen to have the full reality of their needs represented in order to ensure they receive an equitable share of the resources. In this respect, the need for increased participation in planning processes and needs assessments was advanced.

#### 'The pains of regional exclusion'

Preliminary research for this monitoring presented comparable views. For example, in 2010 the ACCS conducted research in which a government official noted that '[a]wareness about the PRDP is broad but there is not enough bottom-up planning; it is still mostly top-down.

There is hardly any return to the grassroots to collect project ideas'.<sup>140</sup> The study concluded that '[w]hen it comes to the implementation of projects under the PRDP, there is the issue of limited community participation in the planning and implementation of the projects. Within this perspective, the communities seem rather voiceless, faceless and powerless in a certain sense.'<sup>141</sup> Such limited participation can be particularly volatile in contexts of recovery and development interventions, such as those under the PRDP. Here, exclusion from planning processes can be very easily interpreted as exclusion from the resources themselves.

In the qualitative findings, development disparities between different regions and districts were commonly perceived as the result of differences in resource allocation. The main points of contention were twofold: on the one hand, frustration was expressed towards regions that had received concentrated recovery and development assistance as a result of having been impacted so severely by the LRA insurgency. On the other hand, people were aggrieved by the coverage of the PRDP assistance beyond those regions that had been directly affected. In Acholi, there was significant discontent expressed with regard to the coverage of the PRDP beyond Acholi and Lango sub-regions:

*'Why do you want these resources to spread to districts that have not been badly affected, that is the argument ... why should you make someone who has not even seen guns in the East benefit from such a programme as NUSAF that is supposed to target the northern region? ... they should design something specifically for Eastern, that is now where the conflict is ... Something for the Greater North or maybe the Acholi sub-region, why again take to Teso that was not grossly affected by war?'*<sup>142</sup>

In Lango, there were strong indications of grievances towards other PRDP regions/districts, particularly the Acholi sub-region, which was thought to have benefited from the longer-term presence of war. One Lango district respondent went as far as stating that *'they were the trouble causers and now they are the beneficiaries'* and *'because we don't like wars, so we are not taken seriously'*.<sup>143</sup> Such narratives presented particularly strong views, making arguments for the consistent favouring of Acholi over Lango in the development/reconstruction efforts of both government and development partners.

*'The way I see it people always go straight to Gulu and the leaders will say: "this is for Acholi first, Lango and Teso, let them wait for theirs, this is for Acholi first" ... People who come to northern Uganda, they think Otuke is in Gulu, they think everything in northern Uganda is in Gulu, the capital city of the north.'*<sup>144</sup>

In previous studies, the ACCS has commented on the 'pains of sub-regional exclusion' with regard to the PRDP funding allocations. In line with the findings in this study, it has been observed that in Lango there is a 'tacit perception that the bulk of the PRDP money goes to Acholi sub-region'.<sup>145</sup> Within its scope to monitor the PRDP peace and conflict impacts, one of the primary aims of this research is to identify how the PRDP resource allocations interact with conflict dynamics in Acholi and Lango sub-regions. As one panellist in the research validation aptly asked, *'is PRDP responding to conflict, or is it causing it?'* The PCI 5 results presented in this section indicate a danger of the latter.

The importance of conflict-sensitive approaches through increasing community participation in the PRDP processes and the transparency of its funding allocations has been commonly stressed in

<sup>140</sup> Refugee Law Project (2011). Op. cit. p.20.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> KII, district level, Lamwo-Acholi (June 2012).

<sup>143</sup> Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

<sup>144</sup> Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

<sup>145</sup> Refugee Law Project (2011). Op. cit. p.24.

related studies. In its appraisal of the PRDP, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) warned that low awareness of the Plan and ‘low capacity for conflict-sensitive implementation at both national and local government level’<sup>146</sup> could lead to the PRDP funds strengthening, rather than reducing, social divisions in targeted regions. The results of the current study reinforce this concern by revealing strong perceptions of pre-war ‘marginalisation, insecurity and under-development amongst communities and stakeholders’<sup>147</sup> in relation to government investments and funding allocations. In order to avoid these perceptions, NORAD argued that funds must be ‘distributed according to transparent criteria’.<sup>148</sup> Other studies have made similar recommendations, arguing for increased awareness of government programmes through outreach and communication activities, and the necessity of direct community engagement in recovery design and implementation.<sup>149</sup>

In both 2011 and 2012, the majority of respondents presented a sense of disadvantage in comparison to other regions in the country. Moreover, larger percentages of respondents from both regions believed that other regions received more benefits or investment from government than their own. Specifically, differences in business vibrancy, quality of service delivery and infrastructure were felt to illustrate development disparities. In line with these perceptions, respondents advised that government should address regional imbalances through involving communities in planning processes and conduct needs assessments that result in equitable resource allocation. Communities were keen to have the full reality of their needs represented in the PRDP decision-making processes in order to ensure that they receive an equitable share of the resources.

In the qualitative findings, development disparities between regions were commonly felt to reflect differences in resource allocation. Sentiments of competition and grievances to arise from this had two dimensions: some respondents expressed feelings of resentment towards regions that had received concentrated recovery and development assistance as a result of having been impacted so severely by the LRA insurgency. Others presented equal frustration at the coverage of the PRDP assistance beyond those regions that had been directly affected. In Lango, there were strong indications of grievances towards other PRDP regions/districts, particularly the Acholi sub-region, which was thought to have benefited from the longer-term presence of war.

These results indicate that grievances associated with economic marginalisation and political exclusion continue to linger in Acholi and Lango sub-regions, reinforced by the destructive impact the war has had on their development. Such perceptions threaten the sustainability of the regions’ peace. Results indicated that the PRDP resource allocations have the potential to incite divisions and competition, especially at the sub-regional level with regard to the PRDP inclusiveness. In order to avoid this divisive impact, allocations must be transparent and underpinned by conflict-sensitive approaches. Results pointed to a failure on the part of government to sensitise communities to the criteria used in resource allocations under the PRDP, and properly involve them in planning processes. This has given rise to accusations of favouritism, thus fuelling inter-communal tensions.

---

146 J. Claussen et al (2008). *Appraisal of the Peace Recovery and Development Programme for Northern Uganda: Final report*. Oslo: NORAD. p.29.

147 Ibid.

148 Ibid. p.4.

149 P. Pham and P. Vinck (2010). *Transitioning to peace: A population-based survey on attitudes about social reconstruction and justice in northern Uganda*. Berkeley, CA: Human Rights Center, University of California.

## 7. Conclusions and recommendations

At goal level, in Acholi, there was a 9.4 percentage point reduction in the proportion of respondents with confidence in sustained peace and security. In Lango, confidence decreased by only 0.6 of a percentage point.

Results showed that large proportions of respondents had been involved in conflict at a personal level within the two years preceding the surveys. Land-related disputes were by far the most common problem area, with similar proportions in both years. Domestic violence and theft were also common. Tracking the percentage change between 2011 and 2012, domestic violence increased in prevalence by 5.2 percentage points, and theft of property reduced by 6.4 percentage points.

There were strong socio-economic drivers underlying the conflicts identified. Land disputes were attributed to the increasing commercialisation of land in a context of insecure land tenure, and the competing claims of returnees for whom land constitutes the only asset. Domestic violence and theft were associated with high levels of economic insecurity, youth unemployment and alcoholism. Moreover, the inter-personal nature of continuing conflicts – between husband and wife, neighbours, and people from different localities – implied that the absence of war has given way to pernicious forms of violence that threaten the social fabric of post-conflict regions such as Acholi and Lango.

Reconciliation has not taken place and people are still dealing with the psychological effects of the war and its memories.

In the context of strong socio-economic conflict drivers, results under PCI 4 (access to economic opportunities) were critical. In Acholi, there was an increase of 13.7 percentage points in the proportion of respondents perceiving themselves to have access to sufficient economic opportunities. In Lango, there was a slightly larger increase of 14.6 percentage points. Across both regions, there was an overall increase of 14.2 percentage points, from 29.8% in 2011 to 44% in 2012. Thus, despite the increment, the perception of having access to sufficient economic opportunities remained a minority view in 2012. In 2011 only 6.4% of respondents reported having sufficient income to sustain their households. In 2012 this increased to 13.3%. Such results were a cause for concern, and pointed towards the inability of the regions' primary economic activity – crop farming – to sustain households.

In the qualitative findings, it was observed that rural communities lag behind towns and trading centres, despite the recognition that there is great potential for increased economic opportunities through agriculture. In both sub-regions, there was a strong perception that more needs to be done to convert subsistence farming into a viable income-generating activity for rural communities.

Results pointed towards significant governance challenges posed by participation and accountability gaps in local government service delivery and the management of the PRDP. Under PCI 2 (local government responsiveness to community needs), findings showed very low levels of community participation in planning and budget prioritisation activities, especially among women. Such limited involvement raised challenges, including the lack of ownership on the part of the community towards the services provided to them, which, in turn, threatens their sustainability.

The study also identified participation gaps that were fuelling discontent at local government levels. Officials expressed frustration and feelings of disempowerment due to the PRDP activities being controlled centrally – leaving local government unable to meaningfully engage in project planning, implementation and monitoring. Exacerbating such challenges were allegations of

corruption resulting in sub-standard infrastructure, perceptions of neglect and a general lack of trust in government and local authorities. Results also pointed to a failure on the part of government to sensitise communities on the criteria used in resource allocations under the PRDP, and properly involve them in planning processes. This has given rise to accusations of favouritism, thus fuelling inter-communal tensions. In order to prevent feelings of marginalisation arising from perceptions of unequal resource allocations, it is essential that local government and the PRDP activities be underpinned by transparent and participatory conflict-sensitive approaches.

Finally, the prevalence of the three most common forms of conflict identified in this research – land disputes, domestic violence and theft of property – points towards the current failure of the PRDP interventions to build sustainable peace in northern Uganda. Conflict drivers such as competition over land and resources, as well as the psychological and socio-economic effects of the war, have not been adequately addressed. As well as infrastructural development, the PRDP II must respond to the socio-economic and psycho-social needs of vulnerable groups such as IDPs, ex-combatants and the unemployed youth. The combination of having been exposed to sustained levels of trauma and personalised forms of violence, alongside current economic insecurity, is a volatile mix that deserves urgent attention under the PRDP framework.

## Key recommendations

### Central government

The central government ought to address the seeds of conflict through putting greater emphasis on and resources into the Peacebuilding and Reconciliation (Strategic Objective 4) component of the PRDP. Building sustainable peace and recovery involves more than the construction of economic infrastructure and consolidation of authority. The PRDP must channel increased resources into the “software” aspects of peacebuilding and recovery. This would include areas of psycho-social support through, for example, maintaining re-integration centres and expanding their services as they cater for those facing psycho-social and economic challenges after being re-integrated into the communities. The much-needed implementation of a comprehensive transitional justice process must also be prioritised.

The central government should address the needs of vulnerable groups more adequately in interventions designed to increase economic opportunities and improve livelihoods. Findings pointed towards the limited reach of government livelihood programmes such as the NUSAF and the NAADS. There was a perception that those who already have the necessary assets and capacity to take advantage of such opportunities are being favoured over a broader spectrum of the less able – and more vulnerable – community members. A critical group, in this regard, are the conflict-affected youth. Strategic Objective 3 (Priority Area 9) of the PRDP II sets out interventions and objectives for improving vocational skills training for the uneducated youth who have grown up in camps, as well as those for improving access to finance and credit (especially for the youth) wanting to set up small and medium-sized enterprises. This study has indicated very limited engagement with vocational skills training in the communities surveyed, despite the sample’s predominantly youth demographic. With youth unemployment being identified as a key conflict driver, it is recommended that interventions under Priority Area 9 be closely monitored. This should form part of wider efforts to ensure that vulnerable as well as viable groups are benefiting from economic opportunity and livelihood programmes in conflict-affected regions such as Acholi and Lango.

Another key factor is increasing sensitisation around the criteria used to allocate the PRDP funds, and ensuring community and local government participation in planning, implementation and monitoring processes. Results indicated that the PRDP resource allocations have the potential

to incite divisions and competition, especially at the sub-regional level with regard to the PRDP inclusiveness. In order to avoid this divisive impact, allocations must be underpinned by conflict-sensitive approaches. Planning must be inclusive and allocations transparent.

### Local government

Local government should develop integrated responses to improve mobilisation for, and engagement with, local government planning and budget prioritisation activities. Such interventions would aim to sensitise communities on their roles under the participatory planning structures already in place and build capacity for meaningful civic engagement. They should have a strong gender focus, in response to particularly low participation levels identified in this study among women.

### Development partners

Development partners should explore alternative options to budget support, for instance, the feasibility of direct support to local governments, or shadow alignment to the local government portion of the budget grant. In the event of providing direct support to local governments, mechanisms that avoid fiduciary risk and promote monitoring and accountability will be critical. Such an approach would therefore necessitate a parallel local government capacity-building programme. The degree to which funds adhere to the additionality principle will also be key. Local government respondents in this research presented significant frustration towards central government's management of the PRDP, especially in light of recent fund misappropriation. Increasingly decentralised approaches to donor support must be considered.

Development partners ought to further address participation and accountability deficits identified in this study by supporting community structures for the monitoring of the PRDP projects. For instance, donors could strengthen user committees already in existence. Support for innovative demand-side accountability projects such as those using new technologies should also be considered. One example is the use of SMS tracking systems to monitor the quality of local government service delivery, such as the Ministry of Health/UNICEF mTrac project.

### Civil society organisations (CSOs)

CSOs should review the National Land Policy to address proposed land reforms concerning customary rights, which is the most prevalent form of land tenure in Acholi and Lango sub-regions. In the validation meeting for this research, participants urged the ACCS to carry out further research on how land rights can be made more secure in Acholi and Lango. Taking advantage of certificates of customary ownership currently being issued by the ministry responsible for lands could be one approach. Securing land rights is also one way of tackling economic insecurity as a significant conflict driver in these regions.

CSOs ought to undertake an analysis of the consultative process used by local authorities in planning activities to establish the extent to which effective participation by the citizenry takes place in the determination of service delivery. Identification of opportunities and strategies for better engagement is crucial. Communities need to play a bigger role in service delivery and budget prioritisation. As part of the state-building process, communal identities can be fostered and social divisions diffused in the way communities account for common facilities.

In future, the PRDP monitoring should place greater emphasis on identifying existing accountability mechanisms and structures being used at the grassroots level – for instance, user committees that help local government supervise the implementation of projects. Such structures can be strengthened as one way of addressing the accountability and participation gaps identified in this research.

There is a need to carry out further research into the effect of corruption on the peace and conflict impacts of the PRDP. In light of developing revelations of the PRDP fund misappropriation in the OPM – alongside the identification of corruption as a primary challenge to northern Uganda’s recovery process in this study – it is recommended that the ACCS evaluate existing funding mechanisms and assess the effectiveness of current accountability structures governing the PRDP resource allocations. On a broader conceptual level, advocacy around corruption as a conflict driver could be considered. This would necessitate further research into the relationship between corruption and conflict, and how corruption affects post-conflict peacebuilding.

Focusing particularly on SGBV and land conflicts, the ACCS should identify and develop a number of hybrid customary/formal approaches to conflict resolution. These can be incorporated into the PRDP peacebuilding aims under Strategic Objective 4, which provides for ‘enhancing the roles of community-level mechanisms, taking into account how traditional and formal mechanisms interact’. Findings in this study point towards both synergies and tensions in the way these mechanisms are being applied.



## Annex: Methodology

The research combined a quantitative perceptions survey, qualitative KII and consensus panel interviews, and a secondary literature review.

Through developing and applying a specific set of perceptions indicators, this study used a relatively innovative way of monitoring peacebuilding and recovery programmes. However, it also employed elements of cross-sectional and descriptive study designs. By doing so, it was able to present not only the prevailing perceptions at a particular point in time, but also a wider set of influencing and explanatory factors that can be used to interpret the perceptions. In the survey, communities were asked not only how they perceived various issues/factors in their environment, but also why they held these perceptions. In addition, qualitative approaches, and a review of secondary literature, were blended with quantitative methods to strengthen the findings through broader insights into their prevalence and validity.

### Secondary data: literature review

The literature review covered relevant documents connected with the assignment – including client documents, policy and legislative framework documents, and other relevant studies and reports.

### Primary data collection

#### 1. Quantitative: the perceptions survey

The perceptions survey sought to establish the prevalence of perceptions in the general populace of the sampled survey locations. Alert pre-selected the survey districts and sub-counties. The parishes, on the other hand, were determined by the need to capture urban/town perceptions alongside rural perceptions. In each sub-county, two parishes were randomly sampled and, in each parish, two villages were randomly sampled to constitute the survey area. The survey samples were determined for statistical significance at sub-county level using the Krejcie and Morgan Sample Determination Table.<sup>150</sup> This is because the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) was unable to provide population data up to village level. The proportion of the population aged 18 years and above, both female and male, was eligible for the survey. This population, once calculated from the UBOS's population projections for 2012, was compared with the corresponding one on the Krejcie and Morgan Sample Determination Table, which indicated the appropriate representative sample. In the sampled villages, two listings were made: one of all males in the locality who were 18 years and above, another of all females who were 18 years and above. These two listings constituted the sampling frames. However, specific returns or interviews from each village were determined by sub-dividing the parish sample, calculated prior, by the population proportion on the sub-county sample obtained from the Krejcie and Morgan Sample Determination Table. The perceptions survey for Acholi and Lango sub-regions had a planned sample of 1,055 respondents in 2011 and 1,121 respondents in 2012. The actual returns totalled 1,031 (508 male and 523 female) respondents in 2011 and 1,136 (560 male and 576 female) respondents in 2012.

150 R.V. Krejcie and D.W. Morgan (1970). 'Determining sample size for research activities', *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Vol. 30, pp.607-610. Available at <http://opa.uprrp.edu/InvlnsDocs/KrejcieandMorgan.pdf>

## 2. Qualitative: Consensus panels and KIIs

The panels sought to establish qualitative consensus on perceptions and the drivers of those perceptions, while identifying and maintaining unique perspectives. These panels were conducted as facilitated roundtable discussions that involved on average six to eight individuals at district, sub-county and community (parish) levels. They were carried out in every district included in the survey. It should be noted that not all desired respondents were able to attend the panels mostly due to mobilisation limitations; some were interviewed as KIIs. The district leadership of Lamwo was accessed purely through KIIs.

Qualitative data was predominantly obtained in 2012, as the 2011 baseline consisted of primarily quantitative data collection. Altogether, the panels yielded a total of 146 respondents (57 at district level, 48 at sub-county level and 41 at parish level).

## Data processing and report writing

All the panel discussion data was voice recorded wherever participants allowed. Panel and KI data transcripts were created and the content analysed. Commonalities and differences were drawn to establish the most prevalent and also unique perceptions.

In both 2011 and 2012, the survey data was cleaned and captured electronically into STATA. The analysis focused on perception prevalence for each PCI and on ranking and rating the key drivers of perceptions presented under each indicator.

Report writing analysed comparative 2011 and 2012 quantitative data, and blended analysis of qualitative data obtained mostly in 2012 to enrich and broaden the findings arising from comparative quantitative analysis. The report is divided into five parts: Executive summary; Introduction (including conceptualisation and objectives); Findings (for each PCI); Conclusions and recommendations; and Methodology.

**Table 28: Sample demographic characteristics**

	2011		2012	
	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,032</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,136</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Region</b>				
Acholi	650	63.0	761	67
Lango	382	37.0	375	33
<b>District</b>				
Amuru	228	22.1	187	16.5
Gulu	102	9.9	196	17.3
Kitgum	179	17.3	194	17.1
Lamwo	141	13.7	184	16.2
Lira	159	15.4	188	16.5
Otuke	223	21.6	187	16.5
<b>Sub-county</b>				
Adekokwok	79	7.7	115	10.1
Adwari	120	11.6	88	7.7
Amach	80	7.8	73	6.4
Amuru	111	10.8	71	6.3
Awach	0	0.0	41	3.6
Kitgum T.C.	120	11.6	105	9.2
Lokung	54	5.2	61	5.4
Odek	53	5.1	0	0.0

Orom	59	5.7	88	7.7
Orum	103	10.0	99	8.7
Pabbo	117	11.3	116	10.2
Padibe East	87	8.4	124	10.9
Pece	49	4.7	155	13.6
<b>Parish/Ward</b>				
Adyaka	80	7.8	36	3.2
Agweng	58	5.6	51	4.5
Anepmoroto	103	10.0	50	4.4
Ating	0	0.0	49	4.3
Banya	0	0.0	37	3.3
Boke	0	0.0	57	5.0
Boroboro	79	7.7	58	5.1
Gaya	26	2.5	53	4.7
Kal	93	9.0	63	5.5
Kiteny	0	0.0	52	4.6
Kuluye	86	8.3	65	5.7
Loliya	59	5.7	36	3.2
Omito	62	6.0	37	3.3
Paduny	53	5.1	23	2.0
Pagak	33	3.2	37	3.3
Pager	120	11.6	50	4.4
Paibona	0	0.0	18	1.6
Pamucha	76	7.4	34	3.0
Pangira	0	0.0	36	3.2
Pobel	54	5.2	25	2.2
Pondwong	0	0.0	55	4.8
Tegwara	49	4.8	84	7.4
Vanguard	0	0.0	71	6.3
Wangtit	0	0.0	59	5.2
<b>Gender</b>				
Male	508	49.3	560	49.3
Female	523	50.7	576	50.7
<b>Age group</b>				
18–35	640	62.3	620	54.6
36–54	283	27.6	362	31.9
55+	104	10.1	154	13.6
<b>Marital status</b>				
Single – Never married	164	15.9	100	8.8
Married/Cohabiting	715	69.4	802	70.6
Widow/Widower	104	10.1	166	14.6
Divorced/Separated	47	4.6	68	6.0
<b>Displaced</b>				
Yes	901	87.6	1,003	88.3
No	128	12.4	133	11.7

Survey participants were similar in respect to gender and whether they were displaced or not in both 2011 and 2012. By district of residence, however, there were more respondents in the districts of Amuru and Otuke in 2011 than in 2012. There was a larger proportion of respondents aged 18–35 in 2011 (62.3%) compared with 2012 (54.6%). The proportion that reported being currently married was similar in both surveys but there were fewer never-married participants in 2012 than in 2011.

In sum, despite slight divergences, the demographic proportions in 2011 and 2012 were coherent enough for comparative analysis between the years.

### Limitations of the study

Due to the baseline using a slightly different methodology than the Year 2 re-run, there were some limits to the amount of data that could be compared between the years. These limitations applied particularly to PCIs 3 and 5, which were considerably revised and developed following the 2011 baseline.

For PCI 3, the central indicator question was the degree to which respondents felt that conflict-resolution mechanisms address community level “satisfactorily” in Year 2. In Year 1, however, the survey focused less on perceptions of satisfaction and more on the functionality of mechanisms through addressing issues of cost, time, distance and so on. Moreover, PCI 3 was split into two sub-indicators in Year 2: one focusing on conflict-resolution mechanisms for addressing community-level security generally, the other focusing specifically on conflict-resolution mechanisms for addressing SGBV. As a result, there was a greater focus on gender under PCI 3 in Year 2 that could only be coherently analysed with Year 1 data to a limited extent. Direct comparison at overall indicator level was also, therefore, not possible.

Similarly, for PCI 5, results were split into two sub-indicators in Year 2: perception of competition and grievances between the PRDP regions; and, secondly, between the north and south of Uganda. In 2012 they were organised under one general indicator: “Perception of Competition and Grievance between Regions”. The difference in indicators mirrored divergence in the survey questionnaires, to the extent that direct comparison at the indicator level was not possible. Results under this indicator are presented in separate 2011 and 2012 tables.

Finally, a great deal more qualitative data was collected in Year 2 than in Year 1. As a result, comparative analysis focused on the quantitative data. The qualitative data was used primarily to enrich, broaden and validate the findings to arise from the quantitative analysis.

For multiple-choice questions, there were often options that existed in a single year only. However, all options have been presented in the tables.

These constituted the most fundamental divergences between Year 1 and Year 2 methodologies. However, due to different surveys being used, limitations in comparative data analysis existed across the PCIs. Although, as a baseline, it was expected that the survey would be revised in line with research implications and outcomes gained in Year 1, it is recommended that in the future monitoring efforts be made to ensure that data sets are as coherent as possible.







